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AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT ISSUES
Mike Koehler1
This article provides an overview of 2012 Foreign Corrupt Practice Act
enforcement and examines the top FCPA issues from the year. The goal
of the article is to place FCPA enforcement in better context and provide
readers a more informed base in analyzing enforcement trends, assess-
ing enforcement agency rhetoric and policy positions, and in sifting
through the mounds of information disseminated by FCPA Inc.
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1 Mike Koehler is an Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of
Law.  Professor Koehler is the founder and editor of the website FCPA Professor
(www.fcpaprofessor.com) and his FCPA expertise and views are informed by a dec-
ade of legal practice experience at a leading international law firm. The issues
covered in this article, current as of January 1, 2013, assume the reader has suffi-
cient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA as well as FCPA enforcement,
including the role of the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA inquiries.  In-
terested readers can learn more about these topics, and others, by reading Mike
Koehler, The Fac¸ade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010), availa-
ble at http://paper.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_Id=1705517. The author’s
FCPA Professor website (www.fcpaprofessor.com) is also a useful resource for
FCPA developments and analysis, specifically the FCPA 101 page of the site
((FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (last visited Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofes
sor.com/fcpa-101).
This article is part of a continuing series of yearly analysis by the author of FCPA
enforcement data and related issues.  For 2011, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1 (2012), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191149.  For 2010, see
Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre:  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971021.  For 2009, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV.
389 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1599725.
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INTRODUCTION
Part I of this article provides an overview of FCPA enforcement
in 2012 and discusses enforcement trends.  Part II of this article iden-
tifies the top FCPA issues from 2012 and examines the following is-
sues: (A) the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA
enforcement actions, relevant data points that help explain the gap,
and recent setbacks when the Department of Justice is held to its bur-
den of proof in individual actions; (B) the origins and prominence of a
key FCPA enforcement theory that yielded a high percentage of FCPA
enforcement actions in 2012; and (C) how substantively insignificant
events in 2012 became top stories simply because they occurred.  This
examination of top FCPA issues should provide readers an informed
base in analyzing enforcement trends, assessing enforcement agency
rhetoric and policy positions, and in sifting through the mounds of in-
formation disseminated by FCPA Inc.
I. 2012 FCPA ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW
Part I of this article examines various aspects of FCPA enforce-
ment in 2012.  After providing Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Se-
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curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) enforcement data, this
section demonstrates how certain enforcement trends from prior years
carried into 2012.
A. DOJ FCPA Enforcement Statistics
As demonstrated in Table I, in nine corporate FCPA enforce-
ment actions2 in 2012, the DOJ collected approximately $142 million
in criminal fines.




Company Fine Vehicle3 Origin4 Action5
Marubeni Corp.6 $54.6 million DPA Foreign Law En- No
forcement Inves-
tigation7
2 Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” approach.
The core approach focuses on corporate conduct at issue regardless of whether the
conduct at issue involves a DOJ or SEC enforcement action or both (as is fre-
quently the case), regardless of whether the corporate enforcement action involves
a parent company, a subsidiary or both (as is frequently the case), and regardless
of whether the DOJ and/or SEC bring any related individual enforcement actions
(as is occasionally the case).  For additional information on this method of quanti-
fying FCPA enforcement, see What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PRO-
FESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-
action.
3 DPA refers to deferred prosecution agreements and NPA refers to non-
prosecution agreements.  To learn more about these agreements in the FCPA
context, see Mike Koehler, The Fac¸ade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L.
907 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705
517.
4 Refers to the event(s) which initially prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the
FCPA enforcement action.
5 Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement
action.
6 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $54.6 Million Criminal Penalty
(Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-crm-
060.html.
7 E.g., Russell Gold & Charles Fleming, In Halliburton Nigeria Probe, A Search
for Bribes to a Dictator, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2004), available at .http://online.
wsj.com/article/0,,SB109641320921730668-email,00.html (noting that the investi-
gation into the Bonny Island conduct began in 2003, when Georges Krammer, a
former executive at Technip, was charged with embezzlement in an unrelated
matter and informed a French magistrate of various Bonny Island conduct); see
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Smith & Neph- $16.8 million DPA Industry Sweep9 No
ew Inc.8
BizJet Int’l $11.8 million DPA / NPA Voluntary Dis- No
Sales and Sup- closure11
port Inc. / Luf-
thansa Technik
AG10
also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 6 (Marubeni was an agent for the
four-company TSKJ joint venture to help TSKJ obtain and retain contracts to
build liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island, Nigeria.  TSKJ was com-
prised of Technip S.A., Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., Kellogg Brown  & Root
Inc. (KBR), and JGC Corporation. The Marubeni enforcement action in 2012 fol-
lowed FCPA enforcement actions against all TSKJ joint venture members.)
8 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Medical Device Company Smith & Nephew Re-
solves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Feb. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-crm-166.html.
9 Press Release, Smith & Nephew, Smith & Nephew Reaches Settlement with
U.S. Government (Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.smith-nephew.com/news-
and-media/news/smith-and-nephew-reaches-settlement-with-us-gover/; see Homer
Moyer, Industry Sweeps, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofes-
sor.com/industry-sweeps (noting that industry sweeps “are investigations that
grow out of perceived FCPA violations by one company that enforcement agencies
believe may reflect an industry-wide pattern of wrongdoing.”  The pharmaceutical
/ medical devices industry sweep is believed to have originated with Johnson &
Johnson (“J&J”)).  For information on the Johnson & Johnson enforcement action,
see Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Johnson & Johnson, Department of Jus-
tice (Jan. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-
08-11depuy-dpa.pdf (“J&J has cooperated and agreed to continue to cooperate
with the Department in the Department’s investigations of other companies and
individuals in connection with business practices overseas in various markets.”).
10 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bizjet International Sales and Support Inc., Re-
solves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $11.8 Mil-
lion Criminal Penalty (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/
12-crm-321.html.
11 U.S. v. BizJet Int’l, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, No. 1:12-CR-61CVE (N.D.
Ok. Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
bizjet/2012-03-14-bizjet-deferred-prosecution-agreement.pdf. A voluntary disclo-
sure generally refers to a situation in which a company on its own (often through
internal audits or internal reporting mechanisms) learns of conduct that might
implicate the FCPA. After an internal investigation, the company’s lawyers dis-
close the conduct that might implicate the FCPA to the enforcement agencies even
though, in many cases, the enforcement agencies would likely not otherwise find
out about the conduct.  The FCPA does not require such disclosure, but general
securities law issues such as materiality may be relevant even though few in-
stances of conduct implicating the FCPA rise to the level of materiality.  For addi-
tional “carrots” relevant to a company’s decision to voluntarily disclose, see
Koehler, supra note 3.  For potential conflicts of interests in the voluntary disclo-
sure process, see Voluntary Disclosures and the Role of FCPA Counsel, FCPA PRO-
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Biomet Inc.12 $17.3 million DPA Industry No
Sweep13
Data Systems & $8.8 million DPA DOJ Subpoe- No
Solutions LLC14 na15
Orthofix Inter- $2.2 million DPA Voluntary Dis- No
national NV16 closure17
The NORDAM $2 million NPA Voluntary Dis- No
Group Inc.18 closure19
Pfizer H.C.P. $15 million DPA Voluntary Dis- No
Corp.20 closure21
FESSOR (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/voluntary-disclosures-and-
the-role-of-fcpa-counsel.
12 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Third Medical Device Company Resolves For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-crm-373.html.
13 See BIOMET, INC., Quarterly Report (10-Q) (Nov. 31, 2011), http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/351346/000119312512012104/d247526d10q.htm (provid-
ing information regarding the SEC’s investigation).
14 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Data Systems & Solutions LLC Resolves For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agrees to Pay $8.82 Million Criminal
Penalty (June 18 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-
crm-768.html.
15 U.S. v. Data Systems & Solutions, LLC, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, No.
1:12-CR-262 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crimi-
nal/fraud/fcpa/cases/data-systems/2012-06-18-data-systems-dpa.pdf.
16 U.S. v. Orthofix Int’l, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, (E.D. Tex. July 15,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/orthofix/2012-
07-10-orthofix-dpa.pdf.
17 Id.
18 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, The Nordam Group Inc. Resolves Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act Violations and Agrees to Pay $2 Million Penalty (July 7, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-crm-881.html.
19 Letter from Denis McInerney, Chief of Fraud Section, Dep’t of Justice, to Carlos
Ortiz, LeclairRyan (July 6, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/nordam-group/2012-07-17-nordam-npa.pdf.
20 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. Agrees to Pay $15 Million
Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigation (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crm-980.html.
21 U.S. v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, No. (D.D.C. Aug.
7, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pfizer/2012-
08-07-pfizer-dpa.pdf.
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Tyco Int’l Ltd.22 $13.7 million Plea / NPA Voluntary Dis- No
closure23
TOTAL $142.2 million
B. SEC FCPA Enforcement Statistics
Table II illustrates that in eight corporate FCPA enforcement
actions in 2012, the SEC collected approximately $118 million in set-
tlement amounts.




Company Settlement Amount Origin Action
Smith & Nephew $5.4 million Industry Sweep25 No
Plc24
Biomet Inc.26 $5.5 million Industry Sweep27 No
Orthofix Int’l NV28 $5.5 million Voluntary Disclosure29 No
22 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Subsidiary of Tyco International Ltd. Pleads
Guilty, Is Sentenced for Conspiracy to Violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Sept.
24, 2012), available at  http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/September/12-crm-11
49.html.
23 Letter from Denis McInerney, Chief of Fraud Section, Dep’t of Justice, to Mar-
tin J. Weinstein, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP (Sept. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tyco-intl/2012-09-20-tyco-intl-
npa-sof.pdf.
24 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Smith & Nephew PLC with
Foreign Bribery (Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/
2012-25.htm.
25 Press Release, Smith & Nephew, Smith & Nephew Reaches Settlement with US
Government (Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.smith-nephew.com/news-and-
media/news/smith-and-nephew-reaches-settlement-with-us-gover/.
26 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Medical Device Company
Biomet with Foreign Bribery (Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2012/2012-50.htm.
27 See LVB Acquisition, INC. & BIOMET, INC, supra note 13.
28 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Orthofix International With
FCPA Violations (July 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/
2012-133.htm.
29 U.S. v. Orthofix Int’l, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, (E.D. Tex. July 15,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/orthofix/2012-
07-10-orthofix-dpa.pdf.
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Pfizer Inc. / Wyeth $45.1 million Voluntary Disclosure31 No
LLC30
Tyco Int’l Ltd.32 $13.1 million Voluntary Disclosure33 No
Oracle Corp.34 $2 million Voluntary Disclosure35 No
Allianz SE36 $12.4 million SEC Investigation No
Following
Whistleblower Tip37
Eli Lilly and Co.38 $29.4 million Industry Sweep39 No
TOTAL $118 million
Separately analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data in
Tables I and II above is informative, as the DOJ and SEC are separate
law enforcement agencies, triggering different issues in enforcement.40
30 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Pfizer with FCPA Violations
(Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-152.htm.
31 U.S. v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, (D.D.C. Aug. 7,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pfizer/2012-
08-07-pfizer-dpa.pdf.
32 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Tyco for Illicit Payments to
Foreign Officials (Sept. 24, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2012/2012-196.htm.
33 Letter from Denis McInerney to Martin J. Weinstein, supra note 23.
34 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Oracle Corporation with
FCPA Violations Related to Secret Side Funds in India (Aug. 16, 2012), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-158.htm.
35 Id.
36 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Germany-Based Allianz SE
with FCPA Violations (Dec. 17, 2012), available at  http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2012/2012-266.htm.
37 In the Matter of Allianz SE, Securities and Exchange Commission, Order
Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section21C of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 68448 (Dec. 17,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-68448.pdf.
38 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Eli Lilly and Company with
FCPA Violations (Dec. 20, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/
2012-273.htm.
39 Press Release, Eli Lilly, Lilly Reaches Agreement with U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec. 20, 2012), available at http://newsroom.lilly.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=728165.
40 As evident from Tables I and II, supra, there is substantial overlap between the
DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs.  FCPA enforcement typically in-
volves related and coordinated DOJ enforcement for criminal FCPA violations
(whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and internal control viola-
tions) and by the SEC for civil FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or
books and records and internal control violations).  Enforcement from 2012 fitting
this pattern includes Smith & Nephew, Biomet, Orthofix, Pfizer and Tyco.  The
overlap, however, between the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs is not
complete.  As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over “issuers” (companies
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Moreover, the aggregate analysis of DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement
data provides a comprehensive view of FCPA enforcement.
C. Aggregate FCPA Enforcement Statistics
In 2012, twelve unique corporate FCPA enforcement actions
occurred: five (Smith & Nephew, Biomet, Orthofix, Pfizer, and Tyco)
involved both a DOJ and SEC component, four (Marubeni, BizJet/Luf-
thansa, Data Systems & Solutions, and NORDAM Group) involved
only a DOJ component, and three (Oracle, Allianz, and Eli Lilly) in-
volved only an SEC component.
The total DOJ and SEC settlement amounts for these enforce-
ment actions was approximately $260 million.  The average settlement
amount in the twelve corporate FCPA enforcement actions was ap-
proximately $21.7 million; the median was approximately $17.3 mil-
lion.  Two enforcement actions (Pfizer and Marubeni) represented 44%
of the $260 million in settlements.  The range of enforcement actions
was, on the high end, $60.1 million (Pfizer), and on the low end, $2
million (Oracle and NORDAM Group).
– domestic and foreign – with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise
required to make filings with the SEC).  In other words, the SEC generally does
not have jurisdiction over private companies or foreign companies that are not
issuers.  Thus, certain FCPA enforcement actions from 2012, such as Marubeni,
BizJet / Lufthansa, Data Systems & Solutions and NORDAM Group did not have
an SEC component.  As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal jurisdiction over
“issuers,” “domestic concerns,” (i.e. any business entity with a principal place of
business in the U.S. or organized under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and
persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct “while in the territory of
the U.S.”  In addition, the DOJ has a higher burden of proof in a criminal prosecu-
tion.  As a result, and given the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion, certain FCPA en-
forcement actions in 2012 such as Oracle, Allianz and Eli Lilly only included an
SEC component.  As to the DOJ’s discretion, the DOJ has stated that it, “has de-
clined to prosecute both individuals and corporate entities in numerous cases
based on the particular facts and circumstances presented in those matters, tak-
ing into account the available evidence.” See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. & EXCH., A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 75 (Nov. 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [hereinafter
RESOURCE GUIDE]. Based on information in the DOJ and SEC authored Resource
Guide, it appears that factors motivating a declination include voluntary disclo-
sure and cooperation, effective remedial measures, and small improper payments.
Id. at 77-79.  In addition, the DOJ has separately stated that it has declined prose-
cutions when, among other things, a single employee, and no other employee, was
involved in the improper payments at issue and the improper payments at issue
involved minimal funds compared to the overall business revenues. See DOJ De-
clines to Get Specific in Declination Responses, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-declines-to-get-specific-in-declination-responses.
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Six of the twelve enforcement actions were, in whole or in part,
against pharmaceutical or medical device companies (Smith &
Nephew, Biomet, Orthofix, Pfizer, Tyco, and Eli Lilly).41  These six en-
forcement actions represented 65% of the $260 million in settle-
ments.42  Part II of this article details the origins and prominence of
the FCPA enforcement theory that yielded the high percentage of
FCPA enforcement actions against such companies in 2012.
Year-to-year FCPA enforcement statistics, and the arbitrary
cutoffs associated with such statistics, may be of marginal value given
the many non-substantive factors that can influence the timing of an
actual FCPA enforcement.43  Enforcement trends, however, are not
subject to such arbitrary cutoffs, and FCPA enforcement in 2012 saw
the continuation of certain observable trends. Such trends include cor-
porate voluntary disclosures as the basis for a substantial number of
FCPA enforcement actions, the extensive use of alternative resolution
agreements (non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements) to
resolve corporate enforcement actions, and the lack of individual pros-
ecutions in most corporate FCPA enforcement actions.44  These latter
two trends are also prominent FCPA issues from 2012 and are dis-
cussed in more detail in Part II of this article.
Regarding corporate voluntary disclosures as the basis for a
substantial number of FCPA enforcement actions, as indicated above
in Tables I and II, of the twelve corporate enforcement actions from
2012, six enforcement actions (BizJet/Lufthansa, Orthofix, NORDAM
Group, Pfizer, Tyco, and Oracle) or 50% resulted from voluntary corpo-
rate disclosures.45
41 See supra Tables I and II.
42 Id.
43 Because FCPA enforcement actions involving a DOJ and SEC component are
typically announced on the same day, and because the DOJ and SEC are separate
enforcement agencies, FCPA enforcement is commonly delayed while one agency
waits for the other to finish its investigation of the conduct at issue and its negoti-
ation resolutions with a company.  Additional non-substantive factors that can in-
fluence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action, although far from an exclusive
list, include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee departures or
leaves) as well as securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA en-
forcement action.
44 See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 1-2 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2191149 (discussing FCPA enforcement trends in 2011).
45 For a more complete discussion of the pros, cons, and controversy surrounding
FCPA voluntary disclosures see id.; see also Samuel Rubenfeld, Study Says Volun-
tary Disclosure Doesn’t Change FCPA Penalties, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2012, 11:03
AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20120906201507/http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/09/06/study-says-voluntary-disclosure-doesnt-change-fcpa-penal
ties/ (containing the comments of Professor Kevin Davis, co-author of a study that
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II. TOP FCPA ISSUES FROM 2012
Part II of this article identifies the prominent FCPA issues
from 2012 and critically examines: (A) the wide gap between corporate
and individual FCPA enforcement actions, relevant data points that
help explain the gap, and recent setbacks when the DOJ is held to its
burden of proof in individual actions; (B) the origins and prominence of
a key FCPA enforcement theory that yielded a high percentage of
FCPA enforcement actions in 2012; and (C) how substantively insignif-
icant events in 2012 became top stories simply because they occurred.
A. Corporate vs. Individual Prosecutions
FCPA enforcement in 2012, once again, demonstrated the wide
gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions.
This section highlights the gap, provides relevant data points that help
explain the gap, and highlights recent setbacks when the DOJ is held
to its burden of proof in individual actions.
1. Corporate Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements
For most of the FCPA’s history, the DOJ had two choices when
faced with conduct that might implicate the FCPA: prosecute or do not
prosecute.  In 2004, the DOJ used, for the first time in the FCPA con-
text, a third option– a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”).46  NPAs
and related deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”)—together, “al-
ternative resolution vehicles”—are one of the more obvious reasons for
the general upward trend in FCPA enforcement.  For instance, Mark
Mendelsohn, former Chief of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit, stated that if the
DOJ did not have the option of resolving FCPA enforcement actions
with NPAs or DPAs, the DOJ “would certainly bring fewer cases.”47
Likewise, an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (“OECD”) Report stated, “It seems quite clear that the use of
found, “[w]e cannot rule out the possibility that voluntary disclosure does result in
some form of leniency [. . .] but the fact that we could not find any evidence of the
benefits of voluntary disclosure suggests that current enforcement practices are
not creating clear incentives.”) The complete study is available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487. See generally Koehler, supra note
3.
46 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, InVision Technologies, Inc. Enters Into
Agreement with the United States (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_780.htm.
47 Mark Mendelsohn On the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 CORP. CRIME REP. 35
(Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/mendelsohn
091010.htm.
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these agreements is one of the reasons for the impressive FCPA en-
forcement record in the U.S.”48
Since 2004, these alternative resolution vehicles have been
used to resolve, in whole or in part, approximately 83% of corporate
FCPA enforcement actions.49  As demonstrated in Table I, in 2012,
NPAs or DPAs were used in connection with 100% of corporate FCPA
enforcement actions.
Despite extensive use, such alternative resolution vehicles are
controversial because they do not result in any actual prosecuted
charges against the company entering into the agreement and are not
subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.50  Moreover, there is no
data to suggest that resolving alleged instances of corporate criminal
liability through NPAs or DPAs achieves any deterrent effect.  For in-
stance, the OECD report observed, “their actual deterrent effect has
not been quantified.”51  Likewise, a Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) study found, in addition to the absence of any meaningful ju-
dicial scrutiny, that:
DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent to
which DPAs and NPAs—in addition to other tools, such
as prosecution—contribute to the department’s efforts to
combat corporate crime because it has no measures to as-
sess their effectiveness. Specifically, DOJ intends for
these agreements to promote corporate reform; however,
DOJ does not have performance measures in place to as-
sess whether this goal has been met.52
The GAO report concluded, “while DOJ has stated that DPAs and
NPAs are useful tools for combating and deterring corporate crime,
without performance measures, it will be difficult for DOJ to demon-
48 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Phase 3 Report on Implementing
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United States, 20 (Oct. 2010), available
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase
3reportEN.pdf [hereinafter OECD Phase 3]; see also The Problem With FCPA En-
forcement? Look No Further Than BizJet / Lufthansa Technik, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-problem-with-fcpa-enforcement-
look-no-further-than-bizjet-lufthansa-technik.
49 DOJ Prosecution Of Individuals – Are Other Factors At Play?, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-
other-factors-at-play-2.
50 See Koehler, supra note 3 (discussing the increase in NPAs and DPAs and vari-
ous criticisms of NPAs and DPA in the FCPA context).
51 OECD Phase 3, supra note 48, at 20.
52 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME DOJ HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 20 (2012), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf.
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strate that these agreements are effective at helping the department
achieve this goal.”53
Use of such alternative resolution vehicles to resolve alleged
corporate criminal liability in the FCPA context presents two distinct,
yet equally problematic public policy issues.  The first is that such ve-
hicles, because they do not result in any actual charges filed against a
company—and thus do not require the company to plead to any
charges—allow egregious instances of corporate conduct to be resolved
too lightly without adequate sanctions and without achieving maxi-
mum deterrence.54  The second is that such vehicles, because of the
same factors discussed above, nudge companies to agree to the vehicles
for reasons of risk-aversion and efficiency and not necessarily because
the conduct at issue actually violates the FCPA.55  Thus, use of NPAs
or DPAs contribute to “over-prosecution” of business conduct56 while
at the same time allowing “under-prosecution” of egregious instances
of corporate bribery.
The 2012 FCPA enforcement action against BizJet/Lufthansa
is instructive as to both of these issues.  As to “under-prosecution,” the
BizJet criminal information alleges misconduct by several executives
including Executive A (a senior executive at BizJet from 2004 to 2010
who “was responsible for the operations and finances of BizJet”); Exec-
utive B (a senior executive at BizJet from 2005 to 2010 whose duties
included “oversight of BizJet’s efforts to obtain business from new cus-
tomers and to maintain and increase business with existing custom-
ers”); and Executive C (a senior finance executive at BizJet from 2004
to 2010 who “was responsible for overseeing BizJet’s accounts and fi-
nances and the approval of payment of invoices and of wire and check
53 Id. at 28.
54 See e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall Street Policies Itself,
Prosecutors Use Softer Approach, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-prosecutors-are-lenient-as-companies-
break-the-law.html?_r=2&ref=gretchenmorgenson (detailing the rise in NPAs and
DPAs and addressing, among other things, whether the agreements run the risk of
“letting companies off too easily”).
55 For an extended discussion of this dynamic, see Koehler, supra note 3 (discuss-
ing the increase in NPAs and DPAs and various criticisms of NPAs and DPAs).
Indeed, former DOJ FCPA chief Mark Mendelsohn stated that the “danger” of
NPAs and DPAs “is that it is tempting for the [DOJ] or the SEC since it too now
has these options available, to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that
don’t actually constitute violations of the law.” Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of
FCPA Enforcement, supra note 47.
56 See e.g., Reynolds Holding, Settlements Feed U.S. Prosecutor Overreach,
REUTERS BREAKING VIEWS (Sept. 19, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://www.trust.org/
trustlaw/news/breakingviews-settlements-feed-us-prosecutor-overreach.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-JUL-13 7:54
2013] FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ISSUES 329
requests”).57  The information further alleges that in November 2005,
“at a Board of Directors meeting of the BizJet Board, Executive A and
Executive B discussed with the Board that the decision of where an
aircraft is sent for maintenance work is generally made by the poten-
tial customer’s director of maintenance or chief pilot, that these indi-
viduals are demanding $30,000 to $40,000 in commissions, and that
BizJet would pay referral fees in order to gain market share.”58
Despite senior executive misconduct and apparent knowing ac-
quiescence by the Board of Directors, BizJet was allowed to resolve its
FCPA scrutiny through a deferred prosecution agreement and, should
it abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, the company
will not be required to plead guilty to anything.59
As to “over-prosecution,” the DOJ release states that BizJet’s
“indirect parent company, Lufthansa Technik AG” also “entered into a
[non-prosecution] agreement with the DOJ in connection with the un-
lawful payments by BizJet and its directors, officers, employees and
agents.”60  The release stated: “The DOJ has agreed not to prosecute
Lufthansa Technik provided that Lufthansa Technik satisfies its obli-
gations under the agreement for a period of three years.”61  The ques-
tion remains, for what would the DOJ prosecute Lufthansa. There is
no mention of Lufthansa Technik in the BizJet criminal information
and there is absolutely no articulated factual basis in the Lufthansa
Technik NPA for any charges.62  The NPA could be the most opaque,
bare-bones NPA in the history of FCPA NPAs.  It merely states that
the DOJ will “not criminally prosecute” the entity “for any crimes” re-
lated to violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions arising from
or related to the conduct described in the BizJet criminal information
and DPA, even though there is no mention whatsoever of Lufthansa in
the DPA.  All that is apparent from the DOJ’s resolution documents is
that BizJet was an indirect subsidiary of Lufthansa.  If that is the sole
basis for the DOJ’s prosecution (through an NPA) of Lufthansa, it is
57 See U.S. v. Bizjet Int’l Sales and Support, Inc., No. 12-CR-61-CVE (N.D.O.K.




60 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bizjet International Sales and Support Inc.,
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $11.8 Mil-
lion Criminal Penalty, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-
crm-321.html.
61 Id.
62 See Letter from Denis McInerny, Chief of Fraud Section, Dep’t of Justice, to Jay
Holtmeier, Esq., Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Dec. 21, 2011) (re-
garding Lufthansa Technik AG), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/lufthansa-technik/2011-12-21-lufthansa-npa.pdf.
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troubling as it establishes strict criminal liability for parent company
entities.
Despite the controversy surrounding the use of NPAs and
DPAs, the DOJ continues to champion use of such vehicle to resolve
alleged instances of corporate crime.  Indeed, a notable development in
2012 was Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer’s passionate de-
fense of such resolution vehicles. Speaking before the New York City
Bar Association, Breuer defended the DOJ’s use of such agreements
and stated that they “have had a truly transformative effect on partic-
ular companies and, more generally, on corporate culture across the
globe.”63  Breuer continued:
The result has been, unequivocally, far greater accounta-
bility for corporate wrongdoing – and a sea change in cor-
porate compliance efforts. Companies now know that
avoiding the disaster scenario of an indictment does not
mean an escape from accountability. They know that
they will be answerable even for conduct that in years
past would have resulted in a declination. Companies
also realize that if they want to avoid pleading guilty, or
to convince us to forego bringing a case altogether, they
must prove to us that they are serious about compliance.
[. . .] One of the reasons why deferred prosecution agree-
ments are such a powerful tool is that, in many ways, a
DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative
effect as a guilty plea: when a company enters into a
DPA with the government, or an NPA for that matter, it
almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to
cooperate with the government’s investigation, pay a
fine, agree to improve its compliance program, and agree
to face prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the
agreement. All of these components of DPAs are critical
for accountability. Perhaps most important, whether or
not a corporation pleads guilty . . . or enters into a DPA
with the government, the company must virtually al-
ways publicly acknowledge its wrongdoing. And it must
do so in detail. This often has significant consequences
for the corporation, and it prevents companies from ex-
plaining away their resolutions by continuing to deny
that they did anything wrong.64
63 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A.
Breuer Speaks at the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html.
64 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 15 19-JUL-13 7:54
2013] FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ISSUES 331
It was clear from Breuer’s speech that the DOJ feels constrained by
the historical prosecute-or-do-not-prosecute system.  He explained,
“Prosecutors faced a stark choice when they encountered a corporation
that had engaged in misconduct – either indict, or walk away.”65 How-
ever, there is absolutely nothing wrong with this choice.  Bringing
criminal charges against a person (natural or legal) should not be easy.
It should be difficult.  Our founding fathers recognized this as a neces-
sary bulwark against an all-powerful government, and there is no le-
gal or policy reason warranting a change from such a fundamental and
long-standing principle.
Breuer’s speech also highlighted how the “Arthur Anderson” ef-
fect continues to guide DOJ policy (i.e. that indicting a company may
result in a corporate death sentence).  As Breuer elaborated:
I personally feel that it’s my duty to consider whether
individual employees with no responsibility for, or
knowledge of, misconduct committed by others in the
same company are going to lose their livelihood if we in-
dict the corporation. In large multi-national companies,
the jobs of tens of thousands of employees can be at
stake.66
However, the “Arthur Anderson” effect is a fallacy and was effectively
debunked by Gabriel Markoff in a 2012 article titled “Arthur Anderson
and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal
Convictions in the Twenty-First Century.”67  Relying on enforcement
action data, Markoff found “that—much in opposition to the warnings
of extreme collateral consequences that are continually repeated in
both the popular and academic literature—no publicly traded com-
pany went out of business as the result of a federal criminal conviction
in the years 2001 to 2010.”68
The DOJ, as evidenced by Breuer’s speech, is clearly troubled,
and with good reason, by traditional notions of corporate criminal lia-
bility.  However, rather than seek substantive solutions to this issue
on a statute by statute basis, such as a compliance defense to the
FCPA, or more comprehensively, Breuer instead defended an alternate
reality that is equally problematic for the reasons stated above.  In-
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Pen-
alty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2132242.
68 See Arthur Anderson And The Myth Of The Corporate Death Penalty, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/arthur-anderson-and-
the-myth-of-the-corporate-death-penalty.
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deed, Breuer effectively conceded in his speech that alternative resolu-
tion vehicles facilitate over-prosecution, stating, “[Companies] know
that they will be answerable even for conduct that in years past would
have resulted in a declination.”69
In analyzing whether NPAs or DPAs represent over-prosecu-
tion, a suitable proxy is comparing the number of individual prosecu-
tions that follow corporate NPAs or DPAs with individual prosecutions
that follow actual criminal charges against a company.  The hypothe-
sis is that the later represents a higher quality FCPA enforcement ac-
tion whereas the former represents a lower quality FCPA enforcement
action.  A compelling date point is that since NPAs and DPAs were
first introduced to the FCPA context, only 6.5% of corporate enforce-
ment actions resolved solely with an NPA or DPA have resulted in
related criminal charges of company employees.70  In stark contrast,
83% of corporate enforcement actions that were the result of a criminal
indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity have
resulted in related criminal charges of company employees.71
By supporting the use of NPAs and DPAs, Breuer advocated an
enforcement environment that insulates the DOJ’s enforcement theo-
ries from judicial scrutiny in all but the rarest of circumstances.  It is
not hard to see why the DOJ favors such an alternate reality.  Such a
system makes its job easier and places the DOJ in the role of prosecu-
tor, judge and jury all at the same time. Indeed, former U.S. Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales stated, as relevant to NPAs and DPAs, “two
important truths” from his time as Attorney General:
One, the FCPA gives prosecutors tremendous discretion
in defining its scope, and, thus, tremendous leverage in
charging decisions. Two, corporations do not like to be
investigated by the Justice Department or the SEC for
violations of the FCPA. It’s bad for business. So, these
cases often settled, charges were dropped in exchange for
either non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agree-
ments. In an ironic twist, the more that American com-
panies elect to settle and not force the DOJ to defend its
aggressive interpretation of the Act, the more aggressive
DOJ has become in its interpretation of the law and its
prosecution decisions.72
69 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice supra note 63.
70 See DOJ Prosecution Of Individuals – Are Other Factors At Play?, supra note
49.
71 Id.
72 See Prepared Remarks by Former Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, WAL-
LER (May 2012), http://www.wallerlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/cp-base-4-
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In addition to insulating the DOJ’s enforcement theories from
judicial scrutiny in all but the rarest of circumstances and allowing the
DOJ to play prosecutor, judge and jury all at the same time, NPAs and
DPAs also benefit the private bar to which DOJ enforcement attorneys
typically run after government service.  However, the alternate reality
of NPAs and DPAs harms other stakeholders and undermines the rule
of law and justice, and for this reason the alternative resolution vehi-
cles ought to be abolished.
2. General Lack of Individual Prosecutions
The DOJ has long recognized that a corporate fine-only en-
forcement program is not effective and does not adequately deter fu-
ture FCPA violations.  For instance, in 1986, John Keeney, the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Criminal Division, submitted
written responses in the context of Senate hearings concerning a bill to
amend the FCPA. He stated:
If the risk of conduct in violation of the statute becomes
merely monetary, the fine will simply become a cost of
doing business, payable only upon being caught and in
many instances, it will be only a fraction of the profit ac-
quired from the corrupt activity. Absent the threat of in-
carceration, there may no longer be any compelling need
to resist the urge to acquire business in any way
possible.73
Likewise, in 2010, Hank Walther, Deputy Chief DOJ Fraud Section,
stated that a corporate fine-only FCPA enforcement program allows
companies to calculate FCPA settlements as the cost of doing
business.74
In recent years, the DOJ has consistently stated that prosecu-
tion of individuals is a “cornerstone” of its FCPA enforcement strat-
13102/media.name=/TAP%20-%20Speech%20to%20LCJ%20by%20Judge%20Gon
zales%202012%2005.pdf.
73 See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing
on S. 430 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy and
the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong. 2 (June 10, 1986) (Response of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.
of the United States, Criminal Division, to written questions of Sen. D’Amato),
available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000011974079;page=
root;seq=4;view=1up;size=100;orient=0.
74 See Aruna Viswanatha, Targeting Executives in FCPA Cases Can Lead to In-
dustry-Wide Probes, MAIN JUSTICE (June 23, 2010), http://www.mainjustice.com/
justanticorruption/2010/06/23/targeting-executives-in-fcpa-cases-can-lead-to-indu
stry-wide-probes/.
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egy,75 and in November 2012, Breuer stated: “If you look at the FCPA
over the past 4 years, you’ll see we really have been vigorous about
holding individuals accountable.”76
However, the DOJ’s rhetoric is hollow.  Since 2008, approxi-
mately 75% of corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions have not (at
least yet) resulted in any related DOJ charges against company em-
ployees.  In 2012, as indicated in Tables I and II, 100% of corporate
FCPA enforcement actions have not (at least yet) resulted in any re-
lated DOJ charges against company employees.  In my 2010 Senate
FCPA testimony, I noted that the absence of individual FCPA charges
in most corporate FCPA enforcement actions causes one to legiti-
mately wonder whether the conduct giving rise to the corporate en-
forcement action was engaged in by ghosts.77  Others have also rightly
asked the “but nobody was charged” question.78
However, as I stated in my Senate testimony, there is an
equally plausible reason why no individuals have been charged in con-
nection with many corporate FCPA enforcement actions.79  The reason
has to do with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement
action in the first place and the above data point concerning NPAs,
DPAs and individual prosecutions is telling.  In other words, perhaps
the more appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” but
rather do NPA and DPAs always represent provable FCPA violations.
3. The DOJ’s Failures in Individual Prosecutions
Although FCPA individual prosecutions are rare, when they do
occur, the DOJ has less than an admirable record when held to its
burden of proof by individual defendants.  Bringing criminal charges
and marshaling the full resources of the government against an indi-
vidual is an awesome power that the DOJ possesses.  Because that
power alters the lives of real people and their families, sidetracks real
75 See Prepared Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/
speeches-testimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf.
76 See Elizabeth Murphy, Breuer: Fight against Corruption One of ‘Main Strug-
gles’ of Our Time, MAIN JUSTICE (Nov.5, 2012, 9:44 PM), http://www.mainjustice.
com/2012/11/05/breuer-fight-against-corruption-one-of-main-struggles-of-our-
time/.
77 See Mike Koehler, Prepared Statement of Professor Mike Koehler Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary - ‘Examin-
ing Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1739134.
78 See James Stewart, Bribery, but Nobody Was Charged, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/business/25stewart.html?pagewanted=
1&_r=2&.
79 See Koehler, supra note 77.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 19 19-JUL-13 7:54
2013] FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ISSUES 335
careers, empties real bank accounts in mounting a defense, and causes
often irreversible damage to real reputations, it ought to be exercised
with real discipline and prudence. While it is unrealistic, and proba-
bly not desirable from a policy perspective, to expect the DOJ to win
100% of its FCPA prosecutions against individuals when held to its
burden of proof, given the above dynamics, it is both realistic and de-
sirable to expect the DOJ to win a very high percentage of its FCPA
prosecutions against individuals.80  In 2012, the DOJ fell short of this
desirable objective, raising the question—what percentage of DOJ
FCPA losses is acceptable?
a. Africa Sting Cases
The most spectacular failure of the DOJ when held to its bur-
den of proof occurred in the “Africa Sting” cases.  In January 2010,
DOJ announced criminal charges against 22 executives and employees
of companies in the military and law enforcement products industry
for engaging in a scheme to pay bribes to the minister of defense of an
African country.81  However, there was no actual involvement from
any minister of defense.  Rather, FBI agents—assisted by Richard Bis-
trong who had already pleaded guilty to real, unrelated FCPA of-
fenses—posed as representatives of a Gabonese minister.  While it was
not the first use of proactive, undercover investigative techniques in
an FCPA investigation, it was certainly the largest and most dramatic
use of such techniques in the FCPA’s history.  The full force of the gov-
ernment’s surveillance capabilities were used against individuals from
mostly small private companies located across America.
In announcing the criminal charges, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Breuer called the manufactured case a ‘‘turning point’’ in the
DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program and otherwise trumpeted that the
charges represented the ‘‘largest single investigation and prosecution
against individuals in the history of DOJ’s enforcement of the
80 To be sure, the DOJ has experienced some recent success in individual FCPA
prosecutions when held to its burden of proof. For instance, and although an ap-
peal is pending, in August 2011, the DOJ secured jury trial convictions of Joel
Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez based on FCPA and related charges that the de-
fendants participated in a scheme to pay bribes to employees of Haiti Teleco (an
alleged state-owned telecommunications company). See Press Release, Two Tele-
communications Executives Convicted by Miami Jury on All Counts for Their In-
volvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications
Company in Haiti, Dep’t of Justice  (Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-crm-1020.html.
81 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of
Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery
Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/
10-crm-048.html.
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FCPA.”82  All but one of the charged individuals was arrested at the
industry’s leading trade show in Las Vegas.  In a sophomoric state-
ment Breuer said, ‘‘This is one case where what happened in Vegas
doesn’t stay in Vegas.”83  In a press release that foreshadowed the con-
duct of the FBI agents involved in the sting operation, the FBI stated
that the undercover operation was like a ‘‘ruse [that] played out with
all the intrigue of a spy novel.”84  A good spy novel often involves sex,
drugs, and criminals, and the FBI’s conduct in carrying out the manu-
factured case touched upon all such subjects causing FBI agents to
openly wonder who would portray them when Hollywood made a
movie about the case.85
The Africa Sting cases were assigned to Judge Richard Leon in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, who immediately
expressed strong skepticism of the DOJ’s enforcement theory and the
difficulties of trying such a large group of defendants and accordingly
decided that the defendants would be tried in four separate groups.86
The first Africa Sting trial started in May 2011 and involved four de-
fendants.87  At the close of the DOJ’s case, Judge Leon dismissed a
substantive FCPA charge against one defendant, dismissed another
substantive FCPA charge against another defendant, and dismissed
the money laundering count against all defendants.88  In July 2011,
Judge Leon declared a mistrial as to all remaining counts against all
defendants.89
At this point, prudence might have suggested a reevaluation of
the DOJ’s ‘‘turning point’’ prosecution.  However, the DOJ quickly an-
nounced that it would retry the remaining charges against the first
group of defendants.90  In addition, the DOJ plowed ahead against the
82 Id.
83 See John Smith, FBI Stung After Sting Involving Corrupt Foreign Practices,
LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.lvrj.com/news/fbi-stung-after-sting
involving-corrupt-foreign-practices-140838393.html?ref=393.
84 See Corporate Corruption—A Historic Takedown, FBI (Jan. 26, 2010), http://
www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/january/fcpa_012610.
85 See Del Wilber, Racy, Vulgar Texts Hurt Justice Department’s Largest Sting
Operation Targeting Foreign Bribery, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/crime/racy-vulgar-texts-hurtjustice-departments-larg-
est-sting-operation-targeting-foreignbribery/2012/02/02/gIQAJZYtBR_story.html.
86 See First Africa Sting Trial Results in Mistrial, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 8,
2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/first-africa-sting-trial-results-inmistrial.
87 Id.
88 See Significant dd-3 Development in Africa Sting Case, FCPA PROFESSOR
(June 9, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/significant-dd-3-development-in-
africa-sting-case.
89 See First Africa Sting Trial Results in Mistrial, supra note 86.
90 Id.
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second group of six defendants, and the second trial in the manufac-
tured case began in September 2011.91  At the close of the DOJ’s case
in December 2011, Judge Leon dismissed the conspiracy charge
against all defendants.92  One defendant, facing only that conspiracy
charge, was exonerated by Judge Leon’s decision.93  The trial pro-
ceeded, the charges went to the jury, the jury deliberated, and in Janu-
ary 2012, the jury found two defendants not guilty.94  As for the
remaining three defendants, the jury was unable to reach a decision
and once again Judge Leon declared a mistrial as to all remaining
counts.95
It is rare for a jury foreman to go public after a stint of public
service, but what happened next may have changed the direction in
DOJ’s ‘‘turning point’’ prosecutions.  Soon after Judge Leon declared a
mistrial in the second Africa String trial, the jury foreman authored a
guest post that was published on my FCPA Professor website.96  The
jury foreman, a nonpracticing attorney, described numerous facets of
the trial and the jury’s deliberations, including its assessment of the
government’s witnesses.  The foreman explained that the jury almost
unanimously saw the prosecution witnesses to be evasive and combat-
ive, stating:
The very low view of their credibility was also based on
the concerns of many jurors related to the nature of the
sting operation. Though, in the end, I am not sure the
credibility concerns were an important aspect of this case
because the jury had the most difficult time ascertaining
the state of mind and intent of the defendants.97
The foreman thought ‘‘a number of jurors were troubled by the nature
of the FBI sting operation’’ and was of the opinion that the underlying
91 See Africa Sting Development—‘‘Mr. Giordanella You Are Excused . . . You Are




94 See Africa Sting—Caldwell and Godsey Not Guilty—Jury Still Out As To Other
Defendants, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/africa
sting-caldwell-and-godsey-not-guilty-jury-still-out-as-to-otherdefendants.
95 See Judge Leon Declares Mistrial As To Remaining Africa Sting Defendants,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/judge-leon-to-de
clare-mistrial-as-to-remaining-africa-sting-defendants.
96 See A Guest Post From the Africa Sting Jury Foreman, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-guest-post-from-the-africa-sting-
jury-foreman.
97 Id.
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view of the jury was that ‘‘the defendants had acted in good faith and
the FBI/DOJ in bad faith.”98
The jury foreman concluded the FCPA Professor post by
stating:
The government has the option to try [the defendants on
which the jury hung] again. As a taxpayer, I sincerely
hope they will instead dismiss the charges. The evidence
simply does not exist, even if they get their witnesses to
behave better under cross, to convict. This is a case that
makes one wish that a supermajority was sufficient to
acquit. Prolonging this prosecution is a waste of govern-
ment resources. At some point in the deliberations, I de-
scribed this sting and prosecution as a quarterback
sneak. Although I came to regret that analogy for the fre-
quency with which it was recalled in the jury room, I
think it apt. The FBI and DOJ designed a play to get the
ball just across the goal line. Unfortunately, in the ensu-
ing pileup, no camera angle shows the ball with clarity
and it is anyone’s guess as to whether they scored.99
Two weeks later, on February 21, 2012, the DOJ moved to dismiss
with prejudice the criminal charges against all of the remaining Africa
Sting defendants.100  The DOJ’s filing stated that ‘‘continued prosecu-
tion of this case is not warranted under the circumstances.”101
The next day, Judge Leon granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss,
stating:
This appears to be the end of a long and sad chapter in
the annals of white collar criminal enforcement. Unlike
takedown day in Las Vegas, however, there will be no
front page story in the New York Times or the Post for
that matter tomorrow reflecting the government’s deci-
sion today to move to dismiss the charges against the re-
maining defendants in this case. Funny, isn’t it, what
sells newspapers. The good news, however, is that for
these defendants, agents, prosecutors, defense counsel
and the court we can get on with our professional and
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Game Over—DOJ Moves to Dismiss Africa Sting Cases, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/game-over-doj-moves-to-dismissaf
rica-sting-cases.
101 See Government’s Motion to Dismiss, U.S. v. Amaro Goncalves, No. 09-CR-
335-RJL (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/goncalvesa/2012-02-21-goncalvesa-government-motion-to-dismiss
.pdf.
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personal lives without the constant strain and burden of
three to four more eight-week trials hanging over our
heads. I for one hope this very long, and I’m sure very
expensive, ordeal will be a true learning experience for
both the department and the FBI as they regroup to in-
vestigate and prosecute FCPA cases against individuals
in the future. Two years ago, at the very outset of this
case, I expressed more than my fair share of concerns on
the record regarding the way this case has been charged
and was being prosecuted. Later, during the two trials
that I presided over, I specifically commented again on
the record regarding the government’s very, very aggres-
sive conspiracy theory that was pushing its already gen-
erous elasticity to its outer limits. Of course, in the
second trial that elastic snapped in the absence of the
necessary evidence to sustain it. In addition, in that
same trial, I expressed on a number of occasions my con-
cerns regarding the way this case had been investigated
and was conducted especially vis-a-vis the handling of
Mr. Bistrong. I even had an occasion, sadly, to chastise
the government in a situation where the government’s
handling of the discovery process constituted sharp prac-
tices that have no place in a federal courtroom. Notwith-
standing all of this water over the dam, and there has
been a lot of water, I’m happy to see and I applaud the
[D]epartment for having the wisdom and courage of its
convictions to face up to the limitations of its case as re-
vealed in the past 26 weeks of trial and the courage to do
the right thing under the circumstances. Having served
at the higher levels of the [D]epartment, I know that that
was not an easy decision. They never are, when so much
has been invested, and the agents and the prosecutors
are so convinced of the righteousness of their position. I
for one however am confident this will be in the end a
positive, if not painful, lesson that results in better pros-
ecutions of individuals in the future under the FCPA. As
for the defendants, I hope the healing process is a swift
one and that they get back to their normal lives in the
very near future. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not
comment on the tireless and spirited effort by the de-
fense counsel from all over the country who came here to
try these very lengthy and complicated cases under diffi-
cult circumstances and some even pro bono. Their hard
work and effective advocacy are a testament to how
strong our criminal defense bar is nationwide. And so
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without further adieu I grant the government’s motion to
dismiss. The defendants are excused.102
The DOJ’s ‘‘turning point’’ FCPA prosecution, the “largest sin-
gle investigation and prosecution against individuals in the history of
DOJ’s enforcement of the FCPA,’’ failed spectacularly.103  The prosecu-
tion damaged the defendants’ lives, sidetracked their real careers,
emptied their real bank accounts in mounting a defense, and damaged
their real reputations.  The press release issued by defendant Lee Tol-
leson’s attorneys after Judge Leon’s dismissal best captures the
human element of the Africa Sting cases:
Lee Tolleson and his family are elated at this unneces-
sary and worthless nightmare is now over with the Gov-
ernment dismissing the multi count indictment with
prejudice. Lee was a victim of a scheme by the Govern-
ment, which was the mother of all gigantic taxpayers’
waste of dollars, to entrap him and others by faking an
overseas business scam. The prosecutors were testing
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by setting up a sting to
raise a national awareness of the law, but the little guy
suffers. The Government went to great expense to at-
tempt to sucker many businesses into a fake business
deal in Gabon, West Africa. The Government pinned its
entire investigation on a despicable character, Bistrong,
who manipulated Federal Agents throughout the investi-
gation, in order to save his soul for his misdeeds. Ulti-
mately, the Government finally did the right thing today
and should think twice about going after honest business
people in the future. Now, where does Lee go to get back
his good name back? He is from a small Arkansas town
with a GED and has a home school education. His family
has been devastated financially by this process. Two
things have kept him grounded; his faith in God and his
family.104
Judge Leon dealt a further embarrassing setback to the DOJ
tied to the Africa sting cases when he rejected the DOJ’s recommenda-
tion of no jail time for Richard Bistrong.  Instead Judge Leon sen-
102 Transcript of Judge Leon’s Remarks Dismissing the Indictments with
Prejudice for Amaro Goncalves and 15 Co-Defendants, U.S. v. Amaro Goncalves,
No. 09-CR-335-RJL (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.nacdl.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=24634&libID=24603.
103 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 81.
104 Africa Sting, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
africa-sting-a-long-and-sad-chapter-in-the-annals-of-white-collar-criminal-enforce
ment%E2%80%9D.
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tenced the conductor of the manufactured sting to 18 months in prison
followed by three years of supervised release.105
In the aftermath of its spectacular Africa Sting failure, a DOJ
spokesperson merely stated that the DOJ’s ‘‘FCPA enforcement efforts
are broader than one case.”106  This statement of course is true, but it
is also true that the Africa Sting case was not the only DOJ FCPA
individual prosecution that failed in 2012 or recent years.107
105 See A Final Embarassing Setback For The DOJ Related To The Africa Sting
Cases, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-final-
embarassing-setback-for-the-doj-related-to-the-africa-sting-cases.  As indicated
above, Bistrong was not charged in connection with the Africa Sting case. Rather,
he pleaded guilty to real-world conduct including conspiring with others: (i) to ob-
tain for his employer [Armor Holdings] United Nations body armor contracts (val-
ued at $6 million) by causing his employer to pay $200,000 in commissions to an
agent while knowing that the agent would pass along a portion of that money to a
United Nations procurement officer to cause the officer to award the contracts; (ii)
to obtain for his employer, a $2.4 million pepper spray contract with the National
Police Services Agency of the Netherlands by paying a Dutch agent approximately
$15,000 while knowing that the agent would pass along some of that money to a
procurement officer with the Police Services Agency to influence the contract; and
(iii) to obtain for his employer (although it was never obtained), a contract to sell
fingerprint ink pads to the Independent National Elections Commission of Nigeria
by making kickback payments to a commission official indirectly through an inter-
mediary company; see also Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Bistrong, No. CR 10-21 (D.D.C.
2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/37880877/Richard-Bistrong-Plea-
Agreement.
106 See Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics Are Doubted, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/fbi-bribery-
case-falls-apart-and-raises-questions.html?pagewanted=all.
107 The Africa Sting case and the O’Shea cases were merely the most recent exam-
ples of DOJ failures in individual FCPA prosecutions.  Other examples include the
DOJ’s prosecution of Si Chan Wooh and Lindsey Manufacturing and its
executives.
In 2007 Si Chan Wooh, an employee of SSI International, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Schnitzer Steel, was criminally charged and pleaded guilty to con-
spiring to violate the FCPA by making cash payments to officers and employees of
foreign, government-owned steel production companies to induce employees of
those companies to do business with, and provide preferential sales terms to,
Schnitzer Steel. U.S. v. Si Chan Wooh, No. Cr 07-244-MO (D. Or. 2007), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/woohs/06-27-07wooh-informa-
tion.pdf; see also Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, Certificate of Counsel, and Order
Entering Plea at 1-6, U.S. v. Si Chan Wooh, (D. Or. 2007) (No. CR 07-244-KI),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/woohs/2011-10-14-
woohs-motion-to-dismiss.pdf; see also Writer’s Cramp at the DOJ?, FCPA PROFES-
SOR (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/writers-cramp-at-the-doj. How-
ever, in 2011 ‘‘the Justice Department informed Wooh’s counsel that a Federal
Bureau of Investigation agent assigned to the investigation of Schnitzer and its
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employees had written a letter to a high-ranking prosecutor in Washington saying
Wooh should not have been charged in connection with the case.” Writer’s Cramp
at the DOJ?, FCPA Professor (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/writers-
cramp-at-the-doj (quoting Joe Palazzolo, DOJ Drops Bribery Charges Against
Whistleblower in Schnitzer Steel Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.
com/corruption-currents/2011/10/18/doj-drops-bribery-charges-against-
whistleblower-in-schnitzer-steel-case/?user=welcome&mg=id-wsj. In October
2011, the DOJ moved to dismiss the case ‘‘out of prosecutorial discretion in the
interests of justice and the efficient use of government resources.” Id.
In 2010, the DOJ charged Lindsey Manufacturing Co., a small private com-
pany in California, and two of its executives, company CEO Keith Lindsey and
Steve Lee, the company’s CFO, with FCPA offenses for their alleged roles in a
conspiracy to pay bribes to Mexican government officials at the Comision Federal
de Electricidad (‘‘CFE’’), an alleged state-owned utility company. First Supersed-
ing Indictment, U.S. v. Enrique Aguilar, (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-1031(A)-AHM),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/aguilare/10-21-10
aguilar1st-supersed-indict.pdf. Various pre-trial defense motions were unsuccess-
ful, and the defendants proceeded to trial. In May 2011, Lindsey, Lee, and Lindsey
Manufacturing were found guilty of various FCPA charges after a five-week jury
trial, and the DOJ called the verdict an ‘‘important milestone’’ in its FCPA enforce-
ment efforts, as Lindsey Manufacturing was the first company ever to be tried and
convicted of FCPA offenses. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, California Com-
pany, Its Two Executives and Intermediary Convicted By Federal Jury (May 10,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-596.html. The
milestone was short-lived, however, as Judge Howard Matz (C.D. Cal.), after
months of post-trial legal wrangling, vacated the convictions and dismissed the
indictment after finding numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. See
Milestone Erased, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
milestone-erased-judge-matz-dismisses-lindsey-convictions-says-that-dr-lindsey-
and-mr-lee-were-put-through-a-severe-ordeal-and-that-lindsey-manufacturing-a-
small-once-highly-respected-ente.  In the words of Judge Matz, the instances of
misconduct were so varied and occurred over such a long time ‘‘that they add up to
an unusual and extreme picture of a prosecution gone badly awry.” U.S. v. Enrique
Aguilar, No. CR 10-01031(A)-AHM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (order granting motion
to dismiss), at 5, , available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/74445224/Judge-Matz-
Ruling-Vacating-Lindsey-Convictions.  Judge Matz specifically cited the following
missteps: ‘‘The Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully
before the grand jury, inserted material falsehoods into affidavits submitted to
magistrate judges in support of applications for search warrants and seizure war-
rants, improperly reviewed e-mail communications between one Defendant and
her lawyer, recklessly failed to comply with its discovery obligations, posed ques-
tions to certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s order, engaged in questionable
behavior during closing argument and even made misrepresentations to the
Court.” Id. at 2.  In a striking close to his opinion, Judge Matz stated: “Dr. Lindsey
and Mr. Lee were put through a severe ordeal. Charges were filed against them as
a result of a sloppy, incomplete and notably over-zealous investigation, an investi-
gation that was so flawed that the Government’s lawyers tried to prevent inquiry
into it. In some instances motives, statements and conduct were attributed to
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them that were wholly unfounded or were obtained unlawfully . . . The financial
costs of the investigation and trial were immense, but the emotional drubbing
[Lindsey and Lee] absorbed was even worse. As for [Lindsey Manufacturing], the
very survival of that small, once highly respected enterprise has been placed in
jeopardy.” Id.
Also relevant to the issue of the DOJ being held to its burden of proof in indi-
vidual FCPA prosecutions is the 2012 conclusion to the enforcement actions
against various former executives of Control Components Inc.  In short, soon after
the trial court judge issued a pro-defendant jury instruction relating to knowledge
of foreign official, the DOJ, on the brink of being held to its ultimate burden of
proof at trial on “foreign official” and other FCPA elements, offered plea agree-
ments to the defendants to substantially reduced charges. See Checking in On the
Carson Case, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 31, 2012), at 3; see also Edmonds Pleads
Guilty as Trial Nears, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 18, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofes-
sor.com/edmonds-pleads-guilty-as-trial-nears. The defendants (Stuart Carson,
Hong Carson, David Edmonds, and Paul Cosgrove), likely mindful of the high
costs of testing their innocence, did what most rationale, risk averse actors in their
position would do – they agreed to plead guilty.  S. Carson was sentenced to four
months in prison, H. Carson was sentenced to three years probation, Edmonds
was sentenced to four months in prison and Cosgrove was sentenced to thirteen
months of home detention. See Carson Sentencing Issues, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov.
12, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/carson-sentencing-issues; see also Friday
Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-
roundup-63; see also Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 14, 2012), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-54.
As relevant to the above action, in January 2013, Bienert, Miller & Katzman,
the law firm that represented Cosgrove issued a press release that stated: “BMK
and counsel for three other defendants . . . conducted a worldwide investigation
and developed evidence suggesting the government’s evidence was incomplete, the
court documents indicate. Ultimately, most companies bought CCI valves because
they were the best in the world (not because of bribes); most of the supposed ‘pub-
lic officials’ denied receiving any bribes; and, in most cases, the alleged improper
payments were never actually made, according to court records.  Further, through
an aggressive litigation and motion strategy, counsel were able to obtain jury in-
structions that highlighted the government’s heavy burden of proof at trial. For
example, the trial court agreed with defense counsel that the government was obli-
gated to prove defendants’ knew they were dealing with ‘foreign officials,’ some-
thing that would have been extremely difficult for the government to prove. The
supposed bribery recipients worked for companies that appeared to operate like
private companies in the United States, making it very unlikely that the defend-
ants realized they were dealing with ‘government officials.’ BMK and other de-
fense counsel raised several other issues that brought the government’s ability to
obtain a conviction, or defend an appeal, into serious doubt. These motions called
into question whether the alleged bribe recipients were even ‘public officials’ as
intended by the FCPA; whether the Travel Act even applied to the case; and,
whether defendants were entitled to millions of pages of documents that had been
withheld from them by CCI, their former employer. Each of these issues likely
would have been decided for the first time on an appeal in this case.” BMK Obtains
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b. O’Shea Case
In November 2009, the DOJ issued a press release when John
Joseph O’Shea was arrested and criminally charged with FCPA and
related offenses.  The release stated, ‘‘the indictment alleges that while
acting as the general manager of a Texas business unit of a U.S. sub-
sidiary of [ABB Ltd.], O’Shea arranged and authorized payments to
multiple officials at [Comision Federal de Electricida (“CFE”)– a utility
allegedly owned or controlled by the Mexican government] in exchange
for lucrative contracts.”108  O’Shea proceeded to trial, and in January
2012, following the DOJ’s case, Judge Lynn Hughes (S.D. Texas) dis-
missed the FCPA charges against O’Shea.109  In doing so, Hughes
stated the problem for the government was that the key witness
against Mr. O’Shea knew “almost nothing.”110
As evident from the case record, this was not the only defi-
ciency in the DOJ’s case. Judge Hughes was also troubled by the DOJ’s
“foreign official” position and its lack of preparation as to the unique
attributes of CFE supporting its position that employees of CFE were
“foreign officials” under the FCPA.111  During a hearing, Judge
Hughes stated the DOJ “is supposed to know before it brings the in-
dictment that it can prove that it is a governmental entity . . . in fact
you should have to convince the grand jury of it.”112  Judge Hughes
further commented that “it does trouble me, although I don’t think it’s
relevant to this motion, that the Government did not present evidence
on governmental status on which a reasonable grand jury could have
relied.”113  The subsequent exchange between the DOJ’s Chuck Duross
and Judge Hughes followed:
Duross: I believe, Your Honor, that we presented evi-
dence that it was a state owned company.
Non-Prison Resolution for Client in Criminal FCPA Case, PRWEB (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/prweb2013/1/prweb10293064.htm.
108 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former General Manager of Texas Busi-
ness Arrested for Role in Alleged Scheme to Bribe Officials at Mexican State-
Owned Electrical Utility (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2009/November/09-crm-1265.html.
109 See O’Shea Not Guilty of Substantive FCPA Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/oshea-not-guilty-of-substantive-
fcpa-charges.
110 Failure of Proof: US v. O’Shea, LAW 360 (Feb. 13, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://www.
law360.com/articles/306032/failure-of-proof-us-v-o-shea.
111 Did “Foreign Official” Impact the O’Shea Acquittal?, FCPA PROFESSOR
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Court: The statue is more subtle than that. I’m not say-
ing you couldn’t have done it or they wouldn’t have in-
dicted him.
Duross: The statute says an instrumentality of a foreign
government. I think in fairness, Your Honor, it is not a
stretch to think that a company that is created by, owned
by and operated by a foreign government, could be con-
sidered an instrumentality. I think in the sharps relief of
a trial in which we are going to be challenged on those
issues, we needed to have been more prepared and we
were not.
Court: I don’t know what was presented to the Grand
Jury, but as I observed several days ago, the Govern-
ment should have been prepared before they brought the
charges to the Grand Jury. It’s something you have to
prove. And you shouldn’t indict people on stuff you can’t
prove.114
O’Shea, a married grandfather with two children and 35 years
of business experience, ‘‘lost his job, savings and home while fighting
to prove his innocence.”115  After Judge Hughes’s decision, O’Shea’s
counsel stated, ‘‘Deflecting blame for bribery in corruption-ridden
countries onto unknowing executives is both Cervantian and
unfair.”116
The DOJ’s FCPA losses in 2012 and in recent years when held
to its burden of proof, would have been troubling even if, for instance,
all of the losses were based on a single issue, such as an aggressive
interpretation of the same FCPA substantive element.  However, such
a common thread was not present in the recent string of DOJ losses.
Rather, and more problematic, the DOJ’s losses were for a variety of
reasons: apparent jury resentment of a bad-faith sting operation, ag-
gressive legal theories, insufficient evidence, and numerous instances
of prosecutorial misconduct.  Moreover, the losses were not merely ad-
verse jury verdicts, but rather instances in which judges took the unu-
sual step of refusing to allow the trial or specific charges to proceed
after the DOJ’s case; a judge issuing a rare post-verdict dismissal be-
cause of prosecutorial misconduct; DOJ dismissing a case after the de-
fendant had pleaded guilty; and DOJ dismissing several cases before
the trials even occurred.  If there is a common theme in the recent DOJ
114 Id.
115 See Dane Schiller, After Losing Everything, Mexico Bribery Suspect Acquitted,
HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 17, 2012) http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/
After-losing-everything-Mexico-bribery-suspect-2580556.php.
116 Id.
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losses in FCPA enforcement actions, it is this: DOJ’s aggressive theo-
ries and tactics, when subjected to scrutiny, failed.
Against this backdrop, it would be prudent for DOJ to take a
step back and contemplate the future direction of its FCPA enforce-
ment program.  However, it appears that DOJ’s recent spectacular
failures have not yielded such a result.  The head of DOJ’s FCPA unit
stated as much:
I know there is a lot of commentary out there about what
this [DOJ’s recent FCPA setbacks] portends for the
FCPA program [and] certain law enforcement tech-
niques. I would caution everybody not to draw too much
from that. In terms of pursuing cases moving forward, I
don’t think a lot is going to change.117
The substance of the DOJ’s statement is akin to a company found to be
in violation of the FCPA stating that “not a lot is going to change’’
about its future foreign business practices.  The DOJ would not toler-
ate such a cavalier stance from a company, and such a cavalier stance
should not be tolerated from a law enforcement agency.
To borrow from Justice Potter Stewart’s classic reasoning in
Jacobellis v. Ohio,  I do not know what level of DOJ FCPA losses is
acceptable and the answer may be indefinable, “but I know it when I
see it,” and the number and magnitude of DOJ’s recent FCPA losses is
unacceptable.118
Another prominent story from 2012 was the number of enforce-
ment actions against pharmaceutical or medical device companies.
The next section of this article details the enforcement theory at issue
in those actions.
B. The Origins and Prominence of the Enforcement Theory
Impacting Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Companies
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 after several years of Congres-
sional investigation, deliberation and consideration of the so-called for-
eign corporate payments problem.119  Congress learned of a wide
variety of corporate payments to a wide variety of foreign recipients for
117 See Kevin Gray, U.S. Prosecutor Says Tough Tactics to Remain in Bribery
Fight, THOMPSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Mar. 1, 2012), http://newsandinsight.
thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/03_-_March/U_S__prosecutor_says_tough_
tactics_to_remain_in_bribery_fight/.
118 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
119 For an overview of the legislative history leading up to the FCPA’s enactment,
see Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
929 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185
406.
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a wide variety of reasons.120  Congress could have legislated as to the
wide range of foreign corporate payments discovered; yet, in passing
the FCPA, Congress intended to capture only a narrow category of
such payments to a narrow category of foreign recipients.121
In passing the FCPA, Congress was primarily concerned with
the foreign policy implications of foreign government leaders being ac-
countable to U.S. corporations because of improper payments.122  As a
member of Congress stated, “Surely the public expects more than to
have foreign policy made in the board rooms of United Brands or Lock-
heed.”123  The United Brands scandal principally involved payments to
Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, the President of Honduras, while the Lock-
heed scandal principally involved payments to Japanese Prime Minis-
ter Tanaka, Prince Bernhard (the Inspector General of the Dutch
Armed Forces and the husband of Queen Juliana of the Netherlands),
and Italian political parties.124 Other foreign corporate payments
which also prompted Congressional concern and further motivated
Congress to enact the FCPA included:  Gulf Oil, which principally in-
volved contributions to the political campaign of the President of the
Republic of Korea; Northrop, involving payments to a Saudi Arabian
general; Exxon, involving contributions to Italian political parties; Mo-
bil Oil, similarly involving contributions to Italian political parties;
and Ashland Oil, which principally involved payments to Albert Ber-
nard Bongo, the President of Gabon.125
As highlighted above, FCPA enforcement actions against phar-
maceutical and medical device companies comprised 50% of corporate
FCPA enforcement actions in 2012.126  Like many enforcement actions
in this era of FCPA enforcement, these actions had nothing to do with
the type of foreign recipients Congress had in mind when it passed the
FCPA.  Rather, pharmaceutical and medical device companies were
the subject of FCPA scrutiny because of an aggressive and dubious
FCPA enforcement theory—a theory that has never been subjected to
judicial scrutiny.  The enforcement theory is that employees—such as
physicians, nurses, mid-wives, lab personnel, etc—of certain foreign
health care systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA and thus
occupy a status equal to traditional bona fide government officials.
The prominence of this enforcement theory in 2012 is best
demonstrated by Table III, which details every corporate FCPA en-
120 See id. at 1003.
121 See id.
122 Id. at 938-43.
123 Id. at 942.
124 Id. at 934-35.
125 Koehler, supra note 111, at 934-35.
126 See supra note 41.
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forcement action in 2012 along with the alleged “foreign official” per
the DOJ or SEC resolution documents.
TABLE III – THE “FOREIGN OFFICIALS” OF 2012127
Enforcement Action Alleged “Foreign Official”
Marubeni DOJ
As in prior Bonny Island bribery enforcement actions, the
“foreign officials” were Nigeria LNG Limited (“NLNG”) officers
and employees. NLNG is majority owned by multinational oil
companies, and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(“NNPC”) owns 49% of NLNG. “[T]hrough the NLNG board
members appointed by NNPC, among other means, the
Nigerian government exercised control over NLNG, including
but not limited to the ability to block the award of EPC
contracts.” In addition, the Marubeni enforcement action (like
the prior enforcement actions) generically refers to the other
Nigerian government officials.128
Smith & Nephew DOJ
“Greece has a national healthcare system wherein most Greek
hospitals are publicly owned and operated. Health care
providers who work at publicly-owned hospitals (“HCPs”) are
government employees, providing health care services in their
official capacities. Therefore, such HCPs in Greece are “foreign
officials” as that term is defined in the FCPA.”129
SEC
“Greece has a national health care system wherein most Greek
hospitals are publicly-owned and operated. Healthcare
providers, including doctors, who work at publicly-owned
hospitals are government employees, providing healthcare
services in their official capacities. The public doctors in Greece
are “foreign officials” as that term is defined in the FCPA”130
127 This table is based on information from the DOJ or SEC’s charging documents.
As evident from the information in the table, in certain instances the enforcement
agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other
instances with virtually no specificity.  Certain of the enforcement actions in the
table technically only involved FCPA books and records and internal control
charges.  However, actual charges in most FCPA enforcement actions hinge on
voluntary disclosure, cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal
issues. Thus, even if an FCPA enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-
bribery charges, the action remains very much about the “foreign officials” involved.
128 U.S. v. Marubeni, No. 12-CR-022 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-inform
ation.pdf.
129 U.S. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 1:12-CR-30-RBW (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-
02-06-s-n-information.pdf.
130 Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 1:12-cv-00187 (D.D.C. Feb. 6,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22252.pdf.
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BizJet / Lufthansa DOJ
Foreign government customers, including the Mexican Federal
Police, the Mexican President’s Fleet [the air fleet for the
President of Mexico], Sinaola [the air fleet for the Governor of
the Mexican State of Sinaloa], the Panama Aviation Authority,
and other customers.
The foreign officials are identified as follows: Official 1 – “a
Captain in the Mexican Federal Police;” Official 2 – “a Colonel
in the Mexican President’s Fleet;” Official 3 – “a Captain in the
Mexican President’s Fleet;” Official 4 – “employed by the
Mexican President’s Fleet;” Official 5 – “a Director of Air
Services at Sinaloa;” and Official 6 – “a chief mechanic at the
Panama Aviation Authority.”131
Biomet DOJ
“Argentina has a public healthcare system wherein
approximately half of hospitals are publicly owned and
operated. Health care providers (“HCPs”) who work in the
public sector are government employees, providing health care
services in their official capacities. Therefore, such HCPs in
Argentina are ‘foreign officials’ as that term is defined in the
FCPA.”
“Brazil has a socialized public healthcare system that provides
universal health care to all Brazilian citizens, and the majority
of hospitals are publicly-controlled. HCPs who work in the
public sector are government employees, providing health care
services in their official capacities. Therefore, such HCPs in
Brazil are ‘foreign officials’ as that term is defined in the
FCPA.”
“China has a national healthcare system wherein most Chinese
hospitals are publicly owned and operated. HCPs who work at
publicly-owned hospitals are government employees, providing
health care services in their official capacities.”132
SEC
“[P]ublic doctors employed by public hospitals and agencies in
Argentina, Brazil, and China.”133
131 U.S. v. Bizjet International Sales & Support, Inc., No. 12-CR-61-CVE  (N.D.
Okla. Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/bizjet/2012-03-14-bizjet-information.pdf.
132 U.S. v. Biomet, Inc., No. 1:12-cr-80-RBW (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/biomet/2012-03-26-biomet-inform
ation.pdf.
133 Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 1:12-cv-00454 (D.D.C. Mar. 26,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22306.pdf.
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Data Systems & DOJ
Solutions Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (“INPP”) is described as a “state-
owned nuclear power plant in Lithuania and an ‘agency’ and
‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government
The INPP employees are described as follows: Official 1 (the
Deputy Head of the Instrumentation & Controls Department at
INPP with influence over the award of contracts); Official 2
(the Head of Instrumentation & Controls Department at INPP
with influence over the award of contracts); Official 3 (the
Director General at INPP with influence over the award of
contracts); Official 4 (the Head of International Projects
Department at INPP with influence over the award of
contracts); and Official A (the lead software engineer at INPP
with influence over the award of contracts).134
Orthofix DOJ
“Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (“IMSS”) was a social-
service agency of the Mexican government that provided public
services to Mexican workers and their families. IMSS was
created in 1943 by order of the Mexican president, who
continued to select IMSS’s head, and subsequent changes to
IMSS programs were made by acts of Mexico’s legislature.
IMSS provided health care services to tens of millions of
people, including workers, their families, and pensioners, at
hospitals that IMSS owned and operated throughout Mexico.
Mexico’s government funded IMSS through taxation and
compulsory contributions.”
“Mexican Official 1 – a deputy administrator of Magdelena de
las Salinas (a hospital in Mexico City that IMSS owned and
controlled); Mexican Official 2 – the purchasing director of
Magdelena de las Salinas; Mexican Official 3 – the purchasing
director of Lomas Verdes (a hospital in the State of Mexico
that IMSS owned and controlled); Mexican Official 4 – a sub-
director of IMSS”135
SEC
“IMSS hospital employees [IMSS, the Mexican government-
0wned medical care and social services provider]; certain IMSS
officials”136
NORDAM Group DOJ
NPA refers to “customers in China including state-owned and -
controlled entities, including airlines created, controlled, and
exclusively owned by the People’s Republic of China.”137




136 Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n vs. Orthofix Int’l N.V., Civ. No. __ (E.D.
Tex. July 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/
comp-pr2012-133.pdf.
137 Letter from Denis McInerney to Carlos F. Ortiz, supra note 19.
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Pfizer / Wyeth DOJ
“The manufacture, registration, distribution, sale, and prescrip-
tion of pharmaceuticals were highly-regulated activities
throughout the world. While there were multinational regulato-
ry schemes, it was typical that each country established its
own regulatory structure at a local, regional, and/or national
level. These regulatory structures generally required the regis-
tration of pharmaceuticals and regulated labeling and advertis-
ing. Additionally, in certain countries, the government estab-
lished lists of pharmaceuticals. that were approved for govern-
ment reimbursement or otherwise determined those
pharmaceuticals that might be purchased by government insti-
tutions. Moreover, countries often regulated the interactions
between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals, pharmacies,
and healthcare professionals. In those countries with national
healthcare system, hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies were gen-
erally agencies or instrumentalities of foreign governments,
and, thus, many of the healthcare professionals employed by
these agencies and instrumentalities were foreign officials
within the meaning of the FCPA.”
- Croatian Official (a citizen of the Republic of Croatia who
held official positions on government committees in Croatia
and had influence over decisions concerning the registration
and reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in
the country);
- Russian Official 1 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who
was a medical doctor employed by a public hospital who had
influence over the Russian government’s purchase and pre-
scription of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the coun-
try);
- Russian Official 2 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who
was a high-ranking government official who held official posi-
tions on government committees in Russia and had influence
over decisions concerning the reimbursement of Pfizer prod-
ucts marketed and sold in the country);
- Russian Official 3 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who
had influence over decisions concerning the treatment algo-
rithms involving Pfizer products marketed and sold in the
country).
- In addition to the above “foreign officials,” the information re-
fers to “numerous [other] government officials, including phy-
sicians, pharmacologists and senior government officials, who
were employed by foreign governments or instrumentalities
of foreign governments, including in Bulgaria, Croatia, Ka-
zakhstan, and Russia.”138
SEC
“Foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare pro-
fessionals employed by foreign governments” in Bulgaria, Chi-
na, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Serbia.
“Foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare pro-
fessionals employed by foreign governments” in Indonesia, Pa-
kistan, China, and Saudi Arabia.139
138 U.S. v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp, No. __ (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pfizer/2012-08-07-pfizer-info.pdf.
139 Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. __ (D.D.C. 2012), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-152-wyeth.pdf.
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Tyco DOJ
The information alleges: that Saudi Aramco (“Aramco”) was a
Saudi Arabian oil and gas company that was wholly-owned,
controlled, and managed by the government, and an ”agency”
and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; that Emirates
National Oil Company (“ENOC”) was a state-owned entity in
Dubai and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign gov-
ernment; that Vopak Horizon Fujairah (“Vopak”) was a subsid-
iary of ENOC based in the U.A.E. and an “agency” and “instru-
mentality” of a foreign government; and that the National Ira-
nian Gas Company (“NIGC”) was a state-owned entity in Iran
and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government.
- “employees of end-customers in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E.,
and Iran, including to employees at Aramco, ENOC, Vopak,
and NIGC”
- General references to payments customers, including govern-
ment customers, in China, India, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia,
Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iran, Saudia Ara-
bia, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Mauritania,
Congo, Niger, Madagascar, and Turkey.
- “designers at design institutes owned or controlled by the
Chinese government”
- “publicly-employed healthcare professionals” in China
- “a former employee of Banjarmasin provincial level public
water company (PDAM) [Indonesia] and two payments to the
project manager for PDAM Banjarmasin in connection with
the Banjarmasin Project”, employees of PLN [a state-owned
electricity company in Indonesia]
- “employees of a public utility owned by the Government of
Vietnam”
- “a security officer employed by a government-owned mining
company in Mauritania”
- publicly employed health care providers in Saudi Arabia140
SEC
Similar to the DOJ’s allegations above. In addition, the SEC
complaint alleges the following additional foreign officials:
- an employee of an instrumentality of the Turkish government
- an employee of a government-controlled entity in Malaysia
- representatives of a company majority-owned by the Egyp-
tian government
- public health care providers in Poland141
Oracle SEC
General reference in the complaint to “Indian government end-
users,” Indian “government customers” and a contract with In-
dia’s Ministry of Information Technology and Communica-
tion.142
140 See Letter from Denis McInerney to Martin Weinstein, supra note 23.
141 Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. TYCO Int’l LTD., No.__ (D.D.C.
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-
196.pdf.
142 Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Oracle Corp., No. CV-12-4310 (N.D.
Cal. 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr
2012-158.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 37 19-JUL-13 7:54
2013] FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ISSUES 353
Allianz SEC
“[E]mployees of state-owned entities in Indonesia”143
Eli Lilly SEC
Chinese ”government-employed physicians”
“[G]overnment health officials in a Brazilian state”
Payments to “a small charitable foundation that was founded
and administered by the head of one of the regional [Poland]
government health authorities”
Russian “government officials or others with influence in the
government,” ”the Cypriot entities were owned by an individu-
al associated with the distributor controlled by the member of
the upper house of Russia Parliament,” “the beneficial owner of
[the relevant] entity was the General Director of the govern-
ment-owned distributor.”144
In addition to the enforcement theory that employees of certain
foreign health care systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA, an-
other prominent enforcement theory in 2012, as suggested by Table
III, was that employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled en-
terprises (“SOEs”) are “foreign officials” under the FCPA and thus
again occupy a status equal to traditional bona fide government offi-
cials.  Of the twelve corporate enforcement actions in 2012, five (42%)
involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs.  These enti-
ties ranged from oil and gas companies to nuclear power plants to air-
lines.  This enforcement theory was not unique to 2012, but has
become a prominent FCPA enforcement theory over the past few
years.  For instance, in 2011, 81% of corporate FCPA enforcement ac-
tions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs.145  In
2010, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole
or in part, employees of alleged SOEs.146  In 2009, 66% of corporate
FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of
alleged SOEs.147
There is no case law precedent regarding this FCPA enforce-
ment theory;148 however, the issue of whether employees of alleged
143 See In the Matter of Allianz SE, supra note 37.
144 Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Eli Lilly & Co, No. CV-02045 (D.D.C.
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-
273.pdf.
145 See Koehler, supra note 44.
146 See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 108-19 (2011), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971021.
147 See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 410-14 (2010).
148 For a discussion of trial court decisions regarding this enforcement theory, see
Koehler, supra note 44.  These trial court challenges relied in part on my declara-
tion which detailed the FCPA’s extensive legislative history relevant to the “for-
eign official” issue. See Declaration of Professor Michael Koehler, available at
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SOEs are “foreign officials” under the FCPA is currently the focus of
an appeal pending in the Eleventh Circuit.149
Returning to the FCPA enforcement theory that employees of
certain foreign health care systems are “foreign officials” under the
FCPA, although 2012 was not the first year in which the enforcement
agencies advanced this theory,150 it was prominent in 2012 in serving
as the foundation for a significant number of corporate enforcement
actions.  However, a useful data point in examining the legitimacy and
validity of this enforcement theory is found in analyzing the number of
criminal charges filed against individuals based on this theory.  De-
spite extracting numerous corporate FCPA settlements based on the
enforcement theory that various employees of certain foreign health
care systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA, the DOJ has never
charged an individual in connection with this theory.  This is meaning-
ful because individuals, as opposed to business organizations, are more
likely to contest DOJ charges and hold the DOJ to its high burden of
proof.
In short, the enforcement theory that various employees of cer-
tain foreign health care systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49310598/U-S-v-Stuart-Carson-el-al-Declaration-of-Pro
fessor-Michael-Koehler.  In sum, the declaration states as follows, “There is no ex-
press statement or information in the FCPA’s legislative history describing the
‘any department, agency, or instrumentality’ portion of the ‘foreign official’ defini-
tion. Further, there is no express statement or information in the FCPA’s legisla-
tive history to support the DOJ’s expansive legal interpretation that alleged SOEs
are ‘instrumentalities’ (or ‘departments’ or ‘agencies’) of a foreign government and
that employees of SOEs are therefore ‘foreign officials’ under the FCPA’s anti-brib-
ery provisions. However, there are several statements, events, and information in
the FCPA’s legislative history that demonstrate that Congress did not intend the
‘foreign official’ definition to include employees of SOEs.  Among other things, dur-
ing its multi-year investigation of foreign corporate payments that preceded enact-
ment of the FCPA, Congress was aware of the existence of SOEs and that some of
the questionable payments uncovered or disclosed may have involved such enti-
ties.  In certain of the competing bills introduced in Congress to address foreign
corporate payments, the definition of ‘foreign government’ expressly included
SOEs,” and Congress was provided a more precise definition of “foreign govern-
ment” to include SOEs.  However, despite being aware of SOEs, despite exhibiting
a capability for drafting a definition that expressly included SOEs in other bills,
and despite being provided a more precise way to describe SOEs, Congress chose
not to include such definitions or concepts in the bill that ultimately became the
FCPA.”
149 See Historic “Foreign Official” Appeals Filed, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 10, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/historic-foreign-official-appeals-filed.
150 See The Origins and Prominence of a Theory, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 13,
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-origins-and-prominence-of-a-theory.
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is a dubious and aggressive enforcement theory.151  It has never been
subjected to judicial scrutiny, yet it is a prominent enforcement theory
in this era of FCPA enforcement.
The final section of this article highlights certain events that
became top stories in 2012 simply because they occurred.
C. Substantively Insignificant Events Became Top Stories Simply
Because They Occurred
On certain occasions, a substantively insignificant event oc-
curs, but the fact that it even occurred represents its significance.  The
year 2012 witnessed several such events relevant to the FCPA and its
enforcement, including the long-awaited issuance of FCPA guidance,
Morgan Stanley’s so-called declination, and the feeding frenzy associ-
ated with Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure.  Each event is criti-
cally analyzed below and placed in the proper context.
1. FCPA Guidance
When Assistant Attorney General Breuer announced in No-
vember 2011 that the DOJ intended to issue FCPA guidance in
2012,152 predicting when the guidance would be issued became an
amusing FCPA Inc. parlor game.153  When the guidance, “A Resource
Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (the “Guidance”), was
issued in November 2012,154 FCPA Inc. participants en masse pub-
lished client alerts trumpeting the release of the Guidance.155  Yet, the
clear consensus was that the Guidance offered little in terms of actual
new substance to those previously knowledgeable about the FCPA and
151 In the United States, approximately 20% of hospitals are owned by state or
local governments. See United States: Hospitals by Ownership Type, 2010,
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=383&
cat=8&rgn=1 (last visited Apr. 27, 2013). In addition, approximately 150 more
medical centers are run by the Veterans Health Administration. See Where Do I
Get the Care I Need?, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/health/
findcare.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
152 See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attn’y Gen., Address at the 26th National Con-
ference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html.
153 See e.g., Catherine Dunn, The Wait Continues for FCPA Guidance from DOJ,
CORP. COUNS. (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.
jsp?id=1202577792246&The_Wait_Continues_for_FCPA_
Guidance_from_DOJ&slreturn=20130020153049.
154 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40.
155 See Guidance Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.
fcpaprofessor.com/guidance-roundup (summarizing approximately 50 law firm cli-
ent alerts regarding the Guidance).
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its enforcement.  Before discussing the substance of the Guidance, this
section first sets forth relevant background concerning its release.
a. Background
As part of the FCPA’s 1988 amendments, Congress encouraged
the DOJ to issue FCPA guidance.156  A relevant House Report stated,
“In order to enhance compliance with the provisions of the FCPA [the
FCPA amendment being considered] establishes a procedure for the
[DOJ] to issue guidance describing examples of activities that would or
would not conform with the [DOJ’s] present enforcement policy regard-
ing FCPA violations.”157  The Sixth Circuit noted, in rejecting an
FCPA private right of action, that the 1988 amendments “clearly
evince[d] a preference for compliance in lieu of prosecution.158  How-
ever, in response to Congress’s suggestion, the DOJ determined in
1990 that “no guidelines are necessary.”159
In 2002, the OECD, in its Phase 2 Report of the U.S., en-
couraged the U.S. to issue FCPA guidance.  In pertinent part, the
OECD Report stated:
Despite the abundance of articles and commentaries on
[the FCPA], there is only limited amount of authoritative
or official guidance available on compliance with the
twenty five-year statute. [. . .] Much of the authority or
guidance regarding the Act comes from speeches from
DOJ and SEC officials, DOJ opinions, DOJ and SEC
complaints, settlements that have been filed, and infor-
mal discussions of issues between companies’ counsel
and the DOJ or the SEC. [. . .] The status of these various
sources of information is however not always clear: there
could be merit in regrouping and consolidating them in a
single guidance document.160
The OECD Phase 2 report concluded with a recommendation:
In the view of the lead examiners, the time has come to
explore the need for further forms of guidance, mainly to
assist new players [. . .] on the international scene, and
to provide a valuable risk management tool to guide com-
156 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(d) (1998).
157 H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2 (1987).
158 Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990).
159 Anti-bribery Provisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,694 (July 12, 1990).
160 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Report on Application of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Bus-
iness Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in Inter-
national Business Transactions 8 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/oecd-Phase-2-report.pdf.
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panies through some of the pitfalls which might arise in
structuring international transactions involving poten-
tial exposures.161
In 2010, the OECD, this time in its October 2010 Phase 3 Re-
port of the U.S., reiterated their previous recommendation, stating,
“The evaluators recommend that the United States consider consoli-
dating and summarizing [all relevant sources of FCPA information] to
ensure easy accessibility, especially for [companies] which face limited
resources.”162
Despite Congress suggesting FCPA guidance in 1988, and re-
peated OECD recommendations for guidance in 2002 and 2010, the
DOJ refused to issue guidance.  For instance, in the aftermath of a
November 2010 Senate FCPA hearing, Senator Amy Klobuchar asked
the DOJ, “Do you believe companies could comply with more certainty
with the FCPA if they were provided with more generally-applicable
guidance from the Department in regards to situations covered by the
FCPA that are not clear cut or fall into ‘gray’ area?”163  The DOJ re-
sponse was that it “believes it provides clear guidance with respect to
FCPA enforcement through a variety of means” and it then listed the
same general categories of information the OECD identified in 2002 as
being deficient.164
The enforcement agencies state in the November 2012 Gui-
dance that it was partially issued to respond to the OECD’s Phase 3
recommendations.165  However, the DOJ’s above response after the
OECD Phase 3 recommendations calls this motivation into question.
Another likely motive for issuing the Guidance was the en-
forcement agencies’ desire to forestall the introduction of an actual
FCPA reform bill.  As to this issue, the following background is rele-
vant.  After the November 2010 Senate FCPA hearing, FCPA reform
gained steam heading into a June 2011 House hearing.  The House
hearing evidenced bi-partisan support for certain aspects of FCPA re-
form, and at the conclusion of the hearing Chair James Sensenbrenner
stated that his committee would draft an FCPA reform bill.166  Against
161 Id. at 10.
162 See OECD Phase 3, supra note 48, at 29-30.
163 See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/
CHRG-111shrg66921.pdf.
164 Id.
165 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 8.
166 See Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Se-
curity of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 112th Cong.
112-47 (2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-
47_66886.PDF.
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this backdrop, in November 2011, only then did Assistant Attorney
General Breuer announce the DOJ’s intention to issue FCPA gui-
dance.167  Those on Capitol Hill who were inclined to introduce an ac-
tual FCPA reform bill said that they would await the DOJ’s FCPA
guidance before introducing such a bill.168  That the Guidance was is-
sued very soon after the November 2012 presidential election, during a
lame duck Congress, suggests that the issuance and the timing of the
Guidance was in part political.  Regardless of the enforcement agen-
cies’ motivations in issuing the Guidance when they did, it is telling
that it took over a year from the time of Breuer’s announcement to
issue the Guidance.  After all, both the DOJ and SEC have specific
FCPA units, and both enforcement agencies have indicated, in various
ways and in various settings, that the FCPA is a clear and unambigu-
ous statute.
While the Guidance is a useful resource guide for which the
enforcement agencies deserve credit, it should have occurred a long
time ago, leaving people to wonder what if the Guidance had been is-
sued two, ten, or even twenty-four years ago.
b. Overview
The Guidance represents the DOJ and SEC’s interpretations of
the FCPA and the agencies’ “enforcement approach and priorities.”169
The Guidance begins with the enforcement agencies’ positions on the
FCPA’s anti-bribery records and internal control provisions.170  It then
looks at other related areas of substantive law, such as the Travel Act
and Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions.171  Next, the Guidance
sets forth principles of enforcement which cover, among other topics,
opening an FCPA investigation, bringing FCPA charges, voluntary
disclosure, effective compliance programs, and types of FCPA resolu-
tions.172  The Guidance is supplemented throughout the text by eigh-
teen hypotheticals (including sub-parts), which range from
jurisdictional issues to gifts, travel and entertainment; facilitation
payments; successor liability; and third party due diligence; as well as
twelve vignettes (information set apart from the text), which discuss a
range of issues from issuer status to obtaining and retaining business;
167 See Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 152.
168 See, e.g., Christopher M. Matthews, Rep. Scott Hopeful for FCPA Guidance,
Wall St. J. (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/
2012/02/08/rep-scott-hopeful-for-fcpa-guidance/.
169 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at foreword.
170 See id. at 10.
171 See id. at 48, 82.
172 See id. at 52-63.
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as well as numerous other issues such as charitable donations and rou-
tine government action.
Although the Guidance is a meaty 130 pages, there is less ac-
tual guidance in the document than one might initially think.  For in-
stance, introductory material, blank pages and a table of contents
account for 35 pages; the FCPA statute itself and footnotes account for
30 pages; and a summary of previously issued guidelines, such as the
DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure
program, or other substantive laws account for 20 pages.  The portions
of the Guidance that can accurately be described as guidance re-
present little new substantive information to those previously knowl-
edgeable about the FCPA.  Indeed, in a press conference introducing
the Guidance, Assistant Attorney General Breuer said that the Gui-
dance “does not represent a change in policy.”173
Moreover, the Guidance provides the following qualification as
to the actual guidance in the document:
[The Guidance] is non-binding, informal, and summary
in nature, and the information contained herein does not
constitute rules or regulations.  As such, it is not in-
tended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create
any rights, substantive or procedural, that are enforcea-
ble at law by any party, in any criminal, civil, or admin-
istrative matter.  [. . .]  It does not in any way limit the
enforcement intentions or litigating positions of [the
DOJ, the SEC] or any other U.S. government agency.174
Nevertheless, the Guidance is undeniably a useful resource of the en-
forcement agencies’ FCPA policies and positions.  Robert Khuzami, the
SEC Enforcement Division Director, stated that the Guidance provides
a “unique opportunity” for the enforcement agencies to “communicate
directly” with the business community regarding its FCPA enforce-
ment policies and positions.175
This is indeed the greatest utility of the Guidance.  Prior to the
Guidance, the FCPA had a certain “luncheon law” aspect to it, where
FCPA Inc. would host and attend high-priced events at which enforce-
ment agency officials would speak to private audiences.176  FCPA Inc.
would then filter and convey the information to actual or prospective
173 See The Guidance Press Conference, FCPA Professor (Nov. 15, 2012), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-guidance-press-conference.
174 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at aii.
175 See The Guidance Press Conference, supra note 173.
176 See Addressing the “Luncheon Law” Nature of the FCPA, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/addressing-the-luncheon-law-na
ture-of-the-fcpa.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 44 19-JUL-13 7:54
360 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 12:3
business clients, and the enforcement agencies were willing partici-
pants in this dynamic and certain former FCPA enforcement officials
had their professional profiles enhanced by it.
While the Guidance will not completely stop this dynamic, it
means that this dynamic will not be the primary source of FCPA infor-
mation as it once was.  With the Guidance, any businessperson in the
world can now print off a single document and read unfiltered informa-
tion regarding the enforcement agencies’ policies at their desk.  In
short, the Guidance is a useful resource of the enforcement agencies’
FCPA policies and positions because it collects in one document infor-
mation that was previously scattered.
Another use of the Guidance is that it can serve as a measuring
stick for future enforcement agency activity.  Jeffrey Knox, Deputy
Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section, stated that the legal community can
have faith that the enforcement agencies will act consistently with the
Guidance.177  Many will be watching.  In this regard the following Gui-
dance statements are noteworthy because past FCPA enforcement ac-
tions, in whole or in part, have seemingly run counter to the
statements.
• “[T]he FCPA does not cover every type of bribe paid
around the world for every purpose . . .”178
• “The corrupt intent requirement [of the FCPA] pro-
tects companies that engage in the ordinary and le-
gitimate promotion of their business while targeting
conduct that seeks to improperly induce officials into
misusing their positions.”179
• “[A]s a practical matter, an entity is unlikely to qual-
ify as an instrumentality [of a foreign government] if
a government does not own or control a majority of its
shares.”180
• “Successor liability does not [. . .] create liability
where none existed before. For example, if an issuer
were to acquire a foreign company that was not previ-
ously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere ac-
quisition of that foreign company would not
177 Stacy M. Sprenkel, FCPA Regulators Speak on Newly Released FCPA Gui-
dance and Reiterate Unwavering Commitment to FCPA Enforcement, Morrison &
Foerster (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/121120-
FCPA-Guidance.pdf.
178 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 14.
179 Id. at 15.
180 Id. at 21.
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retroactively create FCPA liability for the acquiring
issuer.”181
• “The ‘in reasonable detail’ qualification [of the
FCPA’s books and records provisions] was adopted by
Congress ‘in light of the concern that such a stan-
dard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exacti-
tude and precision which is unrealistic.’ [. . .] The
term ‘reasonable detail’ is defined in the statute as
the level of detail that would ‘satisfy prudent officials
in the conduct of their own affairs.’ Thus, as Congress
noted when it adopted this definition, ‘[t]he concept of
reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weigh-
ing of a number of relevant factors, including the
costs of compliance.’”182
• “[The FCPA’s internal control provisions] define ‘rea-
sonable assurances’ as ‘such level of detail and degree
of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the
conduct of their own affairs.’ The Act does not specify
a particular set of controls that companies are re-
quired to implement. Rather, the internal controls
provisions gives companies the flexibility to develop
and maintain a system of controls that is appropriate
to their particular needs and circumstances.”183
• “Companies may not be able to exercise the same
level of control over a minority-owned subsidiary or
affiliate as they do over a majority or wholly owned
entity. Therefore, if a parent company owns less than
50% of a subsidiary or affiliate, the parent is only re-
quired to use its best efforts to cause the minority-
owned subsidiary or affiliate to devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls consistent
with the issuer’s own obligations under the
FCPA.”184
c. Grading the Guidance
The Guidance does not represent the law despite comments
from the DOJ that one of its objectives in issuing the Guidance was to
outline the law’s content.185  Congress declares the law and courts in-
terpret the law.  The Guidance only represents DOJ and SEC interpre-
181 Id. at 28.
182 Id. at 39.
183 Id. at 40.
184 Id. at 43.
185 See Sprenkel, supra note 177.
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tations of the FCPA and its enforcement policies and procedures.186
Steven Tyrrell, former Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section during a pe-
riod of FCPA enforcement escalation, said that the Guidance is “more
of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes than a guide book for
companies who care about playing by the rules.”187
Although one would not get the impression from reading the
Guidance, in certain instances the courts have rejected, in whole or
part, what the enforcement agencies say in the Guidance.  In this way,
the Guidance is an advocacy piece, not a well-balanced portrayal of the
FCPA, as it is replete with selective information, half-truths, and some
information that is demonstratively false.
Jurisdiction
The Guidance sets forth expansive jurisdictional theories for
anti-bribery violations against various foreign actors.  Missing from
the Guidance, however, is discussion of the DOJ’s unsuccessful case
against Pankesh Patel, a United Kingdom national who was crimi-
nally charged in the Africa Sting case.188  Among other charges, the
DOJ alleged that Patel violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions by
sending a DHL package from the U.K. to the U.S. containing a
purchase agreement in furtherance of the alleged bribery scheme.189
At the close of the DOJ’s case, in what is believed to be the first ever
judicial ruling regarding FCPA jurisdiction over foreign actors, Judge
Leon rejected the DOJ’s “novel interpretation” and granted Patel’s mo-
tion for acquittal.190  Instead of discussing or citing this first and only
instance of judicial scrutiny, the Guidance cites resolved enforcement
actions against foreign actors that were not subjected to any meaning-
186 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at aiv.
187 Joe Palazzolo, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law, Wall St. J. (Nov. 14,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873247351045781188501814
34228.html.
188 See Sarah R. Wolff & Leonard E. Hudson, Following Jurisdictional Victory for
UK Citizen, FCPA Africa Sting Case Ends in Mistrial, REED SMITH - GLOBAL REG.
ENFORCEMENT L. BLOG (July 11, 2011), http://www.globalregulatoryenforcement
lawblog.com/2011/07/articles/securities-litigation/following-jurisdictional-victory-
for-uk-citizen-fcpa-africa-sting-case-ends-in-mistrial/. See generally Indictment,
United States v. Patel, No. 09-CR-338-RJL (D. D.C. Dec. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/patelp/12-11-09patel-indict.pdf.
189 Indictment, supra note 188, at 9.
190 See Significant DD-3 Development in Africa Sting Case, FCPA Professor
(June 9, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/significant-dd-3-development-in-af
rica-sting-case.
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ful judicial scrutiny, in what amounts to self-styled prosecutorial com-
mon law.191
Obtain or Retain Business
The most disturbing portion of the Guidance concerns the “ob-
tain or retain business” element of the FCPA.  The Guidance asserts
that the FCPA was amended in 1998 to conform to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention and these amendments “expanded the FCPA’s
scope to: . . . include payments made to secure ‘any improper
advantage.’”192
By way of background, in 1977, the House and Senate passed
different versions of bills that would ultimately become the FCPA.193
The House bill did not contain a “business purpose” test, but the Sen-
ate bill did.  The December 1977 Conference Report stated that:
The House amendment was similar to the Senate bill;
however, the scope of the House amendment was not lim-
ited by the ‘business purpose’ test. . .. The conferees clari-
fied the scope of the [payment] prohibition by requiring
that the purpose of the payment must be to influence any
act or decision of a foreign official (including a decision
not to act) or to induce such official to use his influence to
affect a government act or decision so as to assist an is-
suer in obtaining, retaining or directing business to any
person.194
The notion that the FCPA’s 1998 amendments conformed the FCPA to
the OECD Convention and expanded its scope to include payments
made to secure an improper advantage is false.
Indeed, the DOJ’s position on this issue was rejected by both
the trial court and appellate court in U.S. v. Kay, a case involving pay-
ments to Haitian “foreign officials” for the purpose of reducing customs
duties and sales taxes owed by a company to the Haitian govern-
ment.195  The trial court decision stated
The OECD Convention had asked Congress to criminal-
ize payments made to foreign officials “in order to obtain
or retain business or other improper advantage in the
conduct of international business.” Congress again de-
191 See Michael Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law, FCPA Professor (Mar. 16,
2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/prosecutorial-common-law.
192 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 4.
193 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-831 (1977).
194 Id. at 12.
195 U.S. v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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clined to amend the “obtain or retain business” language
in the FCPA.196
Although the Fifth Circuit overruled the trial court’s decision
to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the appellate court likewise
echoed the trial court concerning the FCPA’s 1998 amendments, stat-
ing “When Congress amended the language of the FCPA, however,
rather than inserting ‘any improper advantage’ immediately following
‘obtaining or retaining business’ within the business nexus require-
ment (as does the Convention), it chose to add the ‘improper advan-
tage’ provision to the original list of abuses of discretion in
consideration for bribes that the statute proscribes.”197
The Guidance rightly discusses Kay, the only case law of prece-
dent on the FCPA’s “obtain or retain business element,” and accu-
rately states that payments outside the context of foreign government
procurement “could” fall within the meaning of the FCPA.198  How-
ever, the Guidance discussion is downright disturbing given its selec-
tive discussion of Kay.  For instance, the Guidance does not mention
that the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the DOJ’s broad interpreta-
tion of the “obtain or retain business” element.199
If the government is correct that anytime operating costs
are reduced the beneficiary of such advantage is assisted
in getting or keeping business, the FCPA’s language that
expresses the necessary element of assisting in obtaining
business would be unnecessary, and thus surplusage – a
conclusion that we are forbidden to reach.200
The court also stated that there will be instances in which payments
merely increase the profitability of an existing company and thus pre-
sumably do not assist the payor in obtaining or retaining business.201
The Guidance also does not mention the two other times in
FCPA history that the enforcement agency’s position that payments
outside the context of foreign government procurement violated the
FCPA came under judicial scrutiny.  The first occurred in 1990, when
a court granted Alfredo Duran’s motion for acquittal in an FCPA ac-
tion alleging payments to officials of the Dominican Republic in order
to obtain the release of two aircrafts seized by the government.202  The
196 Id. at 686 n. 6.
197 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2004).
198 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 13.
199 See Kay, 359 F.3d at 744.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See United States v. Duran, No. 89-802-CR-KEHOE (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 1990)
(granting Duran’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal), available at http://www.
scribd.com/doc/92621550/USA-v-Pou-Et-Al-Judgment-of-Aquittal-Alfredo-Duran.
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second occurred in 2002, when a court granted Eric Mattson and
James Harris’ motion to dismiss an SEC FCPA action based on alleged
goodwill payments to an Indonesian tax official.203
The Guidance boldly states that payments made to secure
favorable government treatment regarding taxes, customs, and licens-
ing or “to obtain government action to prevent competitors from enter-
ing a market. . .all satisfy the business purpose test.”204  However, the
above information indicates something much different when the en-
forcement agencies are held to their burdens of proof.  In an interest-
ing twist, the Guidance even cites in a footnote the most relevant
legislative history on this issue – House Report No. 95-460.205  House
Report No. 95-460 states that the bill, which would become the FCPA,
does not  “reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the ex-
peditious performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or
clerical nature which must of necessity by performed in any event.”206
The Guidance again opts for citation to self-styled prosecutorial com-
mon law, rather than faithfully summarizing Kay or mentioning other
similar cases when discussing the “obtain or retain business” element
Foreign Official
The Guidance’s discussion of the “foreign official” element of an
FCPA anti-bribery violation is likewise deficient and disturbing.  For
starters, even though the Guidance contains eighteen hypotheticals
and twelve vignettes, the Guidance does not contain any hypotheticals
concerning the important “foreign official” element of an FCPA anti-
bribery violation.
The DOJ’s position on this important FCPA element has be-
come so discombobulated that it was probably easiest to take a pass.
The Guidance, for instance, states that the FCPA “covers corrupt pay-
ments to low-ranking employees and high-level officials alike.”207
However, it fails to discuss the DOJ’s 2012 Opinion Procedure Release,
which focuses not on an individual’s status, but duties, such as
203 See Securities Exchange Comm’n v. Mattson, No. H-01-3106 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 6,
2002), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/83019022/SEC-v-Eric-Mattson-and-
James-Harris.
204 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 13.
205 See id. at 111 n. 160.
206 H.R. Rep. No. 95-460, at 9 (Sept. 28, 1977), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf.
207 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 20.
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whether an individual has control over the levers of governmental
power, in determining whether an individual is a “foreign official.”208
Moreover, the Guidance also creates a situation where the gov-
ernment now has two “instrumentality” positions.  In pertinent part,
the FCPA guidance states that “an entity is unlikely to qualify as an
instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority of
its shares, . . . [but] there are circumstances in which an entity would
qualify as an instrumentality absent 50% or greater foreign govern-
ment ownership.”209  The Guidance then lists the Alcatel-Lucent en-
forcement action, as an example in which the enforcement agencies
asserted that Telekom Malaysia Berhad was a state-owned and con-
trolled entity, even though the Malaysian Ministry of Finance actually
owned less than 50% of the shares, because the Ministry of Finance
was a “special shareholder” with apparent veto power over major ex-
penditures and control over important operational decisions.210
This stance on instrumentality conflicts with a recent rule
promulgated by the SEC, which co-authored the Guidance, in connec-
tion with Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank.  Section 1504 defines “foreign
government” to mean a “department, agency or instrumentality of a
foreign government, or a company owned by a foreign government, as
determined by the Commission.”211  The SEC stated that, “the final
rules clarify that a company owned by a foreign government is a com-
pany that is at least majority-owned by a foreign government.”212
The Guidance also selectively references “foreign official” infor-
mation.  In one instance, for example, the Guidance discusses “foreign
official” jury instructions.213  Yet missing from the discussion is any
reference of the Carson enforcement action in which the judge in-
cluded in the jury instructions a section titled “knowledge of status of
foreign official.”  This instruction stated:
The payment or gift at issue [. . .] was to (a) a person the
defendant knew or believed was a foreign official or (b)
any person and the defendant knew that all or a portion
of such money or thing of value would be offered, given,
or promised (directly or indirectly) to a person the defen-
208 See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW - OPINION
PROCEDURE RELEASE, No. 12-01, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2012/1201.pdf.
209 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 21.
210 See id. at 21.
211 See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, DISCLOSURE OF PAYMENTS BY RESOURCE
EXTRACTION ISSUERS, RIN 3235-AK85, 7 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/2012/34-67717.pdf.
212 Id. at 101.
213 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 20.
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dant knew or believed to be a foreign official. Belief that
an individual was a foreign official does not satisfy this
element if the individual was not in fact a foreign
official.214
Also missing from Guidance “foreign official” jury instruction
discussion is how Judge Hughes instructed the jury in the DOJ’s failed
prosecution of O’Shea.  Judge Hughes included, as part of the “foreign
official” jury instruction,
The Commission [the Mexican utility at issue] is not an
integral part of a foreign government’s public function
merely because it is government owned. It must be exer-
cising a public governmental function. An official of a
public agency does not perform a governmental function
when his agency operates in his area substantially as a
private agency — as its private agency competitors do,
without preferences, subsidies or other privileges. [. . .]
To the extent that a part of the Commission operates a
business on substantially the same terms as private com-
panies, its officers in that part are not public officials.215
Other misleading “foreign official” information is included in
the Guidance.  Consistent with its prosecutorial common law ap-
proach, the Guidance states that the “DOJ and SEC have pursued
cases involving instrumentalities since the time of the FCPA’s enact-
ment” and that the “second-ever FCPA case charged by the DOJ” in-
volved bribes to executives of the Mexican national oil company.216
Missing from this discussion or associated citations, however, is the
fact that the jury found George McLean not guilty.217  Next, the Gui-
dance refers to the ABB case involving payments to officials of “a state-
owned and controlled electricity commission,”218 while failing to men-
tion the DOJ’s failed prosecution of O’Shea, who was employed with
ABB.  The Guidance also references the Haiti Teleco case involving
payments to employees of Haiti’s “state-owned and controlled telecom-
munications company”219 without mentioning that Haiti’s Prime Min-
214 See Checking in on the Carson Case, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 8, 2012), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/checking-in-on-the-carson-case.
215 See Did ‘Foreign Official’ Impact the O’Shea Acquittal, FCPA PROFESSOR
(July 11, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/did-foreign-official-impact-the-
oshea-acquittal.
216 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 20-21.
217 See U.S. v. McClean, Doc. No. H-82-224-07 (S.D. Tex. 1985), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/crawford-enterprises/1985-05-17-craw
ford-enterprises-judgment-mcleang.pdf.
218 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 21.
219 See id.
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ister has publically said, “Teleco has never been and until now is not a
state enterprise” or that that the case had not been fully resolved.220
d. Despite the Guidance, Much About FCPA Enforcement Remains
Opaque
At the Guidance press conference, Assistant Attorney General
Breuer stated that the DOJ strives to be “transparent” as to its FCPA
enforcement program.221  Breuer characterized the Guidance as a bold
manifestation “of [the DOJ’s] transparent approach to enforcement” in
subsequent public comments.222
However, much about FCPA enforcement remains opaque de-
spite enforcement agency claims that the Guidance evidences FCPA
enforcement transparency.  For instance, the DOJ admits to a histori-
cal practice of secret FCPA enforcement in a particularly revealing
footnote.223  Elsewhere, the Guidance hints at non-prosecution agree-
ments with individuals to resolve FCPA scrutiny that never have been
made public.224
In addition, the Guidance states that the
DOJ has declined to prosecute both individuals and cor-
porate entities in numerous cases based on the particu-
lar facts and circumstances presented in those matters,
taking into account the available evidence. To protect the
privacy rights and other interests of the uncharged and
other potentially interested parties the DOJ has a long-
standing policy not to provide, without the party’s con-
sent, non-public information on matters it has declined
to prosecute.225
Charles Duross, current Chief of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit, subsequently
stated that the DOJ “decline[s] on a regular basis, but we don’t publi-
cize it.”226  Transparency is a fundamental tenant of the rule of law
and the Guidance demonstrates that FCPA enforcement frequently
falls short of this basic goal.
220 See e.g., Stunning Haiti Teleco Development, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 29, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/stunning-haiti-teleco-development.
221 See The Guidance Press Conference, supra note 173.
222 See id.
223 See GUIDANCE, supra note 40, at 118 n. 379 (“Historically, DOJ had, on occa-
sion, agreed to DPAs with companies that were not filed with the court.  That is no
longer the practice of DOJ.”).
224 Id. at 75.
225 Id.
226 FCPA Chief Duross to Corporate Crime Defense Lawyers: Don’t BS US, CORP.
CRIME REP. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/
fcpadurossbrockmeyer11152012/.
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Much of the buzz surrounding the Guidance concerns six anon-
ymous examples of matters DOJ and SEC apparently declined to pur-
sue, including a discussion of the facts they considered when declining
those particular matters.227  Contrary to the buzz, this is not first
time, nor most detailed instance, of the DOJ publicly disclosing FCPA
declination decisions.
In the context of 1983 FCPA reform hearings, for example, a
House Committee wanted to better understand and assess the DOJ’s
FCPA enforcement program.  To this end, the House Committee re-
quested a variety of information from the DOJ, including its closed
FCPA cases.  The DOJ responded with “summaries of all closed inves-
tigations of alleged FCPA violations” detailing eighty-three investiga-
tions, summarized in eighteen pages.228  More recently, the DOJ
provided information concerning its FCPA declination decisions in fol-
low-up answers to questions asked at the June 2011 House FCPA
hearing.229  The information DOJ provided to Congress then is sub-
stantively similar to the declination information in the Guidance.
Aside from not being as revolutionary as observers may think,
the Guidance declination examples raise more questions than an-
swers.  For instance, in three of the examples, it is not even clear based
on the information provided that the FCPA was violated.230  For in-
stance, Example 1 in the Guidance at most indicates that a company
received competitor bid information from a third party with connec-
tions to a foreign government and discovered various FCPA red flags
during an internal investigation.231  Example 4 at most shows that a
customs agent engaged by a company’s foreign subsidiary made small
bribe payments without any discussion of whether the company or its
foreign subsidiary possessed the requisite knowledge under the
FCPA’s third-party payment provisions.232  Example 5 at most illus-
trates that a company, in connection with its acquisition of a foreign
227 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 77-79.
228 See generally, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FCPA CASES CLOSED (1983), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/114564132 (summarizing cases that the DOJ declined
to pursue).
229 See DOJ Declines to Get Specific In Declination Responses, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-declines-to-get-specific-in-decli
nation-responses.
230 See, e.g., WILMERHALE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ALERT: DOJ AND
SEC ISSUE MUCH ANTICIPATED FCPA GUIDANCE 9 (2012) (“It is also disappointing
that some of the examples do not make clear that the conduct met each of the
elements of a statutory violation, since the concept of a declination is supposed to
be reserved for instances in which the offense is chargeable but the government
declines in its own discretion to bring a case.”).
231 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 77-78.
232 See id. at 78.
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company, learned of potential improper payments without any discus-
sion of whether the foreign company was subject to the FCPA’s juris-
diction.233  Moreover, in all of the Guidance’s examples, the factors
motivating the declination decision—such as voluntary disclosure and
cooperation, effective remedial measures, and small improper pay-
ments—are often found in instances in which FCPA enforcement ac-
tions were brought.
The Guidance’s discussion of these so-called declinations once
again raises the pressing question of how the enforcement agencies
actually define a “declination.”  The DOJ has never offered a defini-
tion, but they appear to be advocating an expansive definition, per-
haps in an effort to portray a fair and balanced FCPA enforcement
program.  In the criminal context, however, the term “declination”
should be reserved for instances in which the DOJ concludes that it
can prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the necessary elements of a
cause of action yet decides not to pursue the action.  Under this defini-
tion, many of the Guidance declination examples can be compared to a
police officer declining to issue a speeding ticket when the driver was
not speeding.  This is not a declination.  This is what the law com-
mands, and such reasoning applies in the FCPA context as well.
e. Despite the Guidance, FCPA Reform Remains a Viable Issue
Despite issuance of the Guidance and the belief of certain civil
society organizations that the Guidance “renders moot” any FCPA re-
form,234 FCPA reform remains a viable issue, with practitioners and
scholars alike continuing to call for FCPA reform post-Guidance.235
Indeed what the FCPA needs at this critical juncture is not
non-binding enforcement agency guidance, but limited structural re-
form. Certainly there were some FCPA reform measures, such as abol-
ishing non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, which
could have been accomplished through a policy change in the Gui-
233 See id. at 78-79.
234 See Civil Society Organizations Welcome Justice Department and SEC Anti-
Corruption Guidance, FACT COALITION (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.financial
taskforce.org/2012/11/14/civil-society-organizations-welcome-justice-department-
and-secs-anti-corruption-guidance/.
235 See Thomas O. Gorman & McGrath, William P., FCPA Enforcement: Moving
Toward a New Era of Compliance, 40 SEC. REG. L. J. 342 (2012), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=22018312202277; Paul F. Enzinna,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Aggressive Enforcement and Lack of Judicial
Review Create Uncertain Terrain for Businesses, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RE-
SEARCH , Jan, 2013, No. 17, at  1, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/
html/ib_17.htm#notes; Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Re-
form Debate, 38 J. OF CORP. L. 325 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2202277.
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dance.236  However, other FCPA reform measures, like amending the
statute, can only be accomplished through Congressional action and
Presidential signature.  One such amendment I have long advocated
for is a compliance defense, where a company’s pre-existing compli-
ance policies and procedures and good-faith efforts to comply with the
FCPA are relevant as a matter of law when a non-executive employee
or agent acts contrary to those policies and procedures, in violation of
the FCPA.237
At the Guidance press conference, Assistant Attorney General
Breuer repeated the DOJ’s opposition to such a defense, calling it
“dangerous” and a “race to the bottom.”238  The DOJ’s opposition to a
compliance defense contrasts with several former Attorney Generals
and other former high-ranking DOJ officials who have publicly sup-
ported a compliance defense.239  The DOJ’s opposition is further con-
trasted with the fact that several countries that are signatories to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, including the United States, have
compliance-like defenses in their domestic FCPA-like laws.240
The Guidance contains much discussion on how enforcement
agencies purport to reward pre-existing FCPA compliance policies and
procedures when making internal charging and other discretionary de-
cisions.241  Noticeably missing from the Guidance, however, is any ac-
knowledgment that the enforcement agencies’ current position as to
FCPA compliance policies and procedures works.  In fact, the Gui-
dance surprisingly acknowledges that the current system is not work-
ing, as it cites survey data that “64% of general counsel whose
companies are subject to the FCPA say there is room for improvement
in their FCPA training and compliance programs.”242
The DOJ and SEC recognize in the Guidance that “positive in-
centives” can drive compliant behavior.243  However, the enforcement
agencies current incentive – that such compliance policies and proce-
dures can only lessen the impact of legal exposure – is not the best
incentive.
236 See GET RID OF CORPORATE DEFERRED AND NON PROSECUTION FCPA AGREE-
MENTS, 26 CORP. CRIME REP. 14 (2012), available at http://www.corporatecrimere
porter.com/koehler03262012.htm.
237 See Mike Koehler, Revisiting An FCPA Compliance Defense, 2012 WISC. L.
REV. 609, 609-10, available at http://wisconsinlawreview.org/wp-content/files/13-
Koehler.pdf.
238 See The Guidance Press Conference, supra note 173.
239 See Koehler, supra note 237, at 651.
240 See id. at 611.
241 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 56-65.
242 See id. at 62.
243 See id. at 59.
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An FCPA compliance defense is the best incentive for more ro-
bust corporate compliance as it can help reduce improper conduct and
thus best advance the FCPA’s objective of reducing bribery.  In this
way, a compliance defense is not a “race to the bottom,” but a “race to
the top.”  Such a defense can, among other things, allow the enforce-
ment agencies to better allocate limited prosecutorial resources to
cases involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals
who actually engaged in the improper conduct, thereby increasing the
deterrent effect of FCPA enforcement actions.
2. Morgan Stanley’s So-Called Declination
Another event made into a prominent story in 2012, largely as
a result of a herd mentality that has impacted the nature and quality
of certain FCPA reporting, was Morgan Stanley’s so-called declination.
In April 2012, the DOJ and SEC announced a joint enforce-
ment against Garth Peterson, a former managing director for Morgan
Stanley’s real estate business in China.244  The conduct at issue con-
cerned an alleged corrupt real estate investment scheme between Pe-
terson and a Chinese official with whom he had a personal
friendship.245  In the DOJ action, Peterson agreed to plead guilty to a
one-count criminal information for “conspiring to evade internal ac-
counting controls that Morgan Stanley was required to maintain
under the FCPA.”246  In the SEC action, Peterson was charged with,
among other things, violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery and internal
controls provisions.247  He agreed to a settlement requiring him to,
among other things, pay approximately $250,000 in disgorgement and
relinquish his interest in the real estate.248
What catapulted the Peterson enforcement action to a promi-
nent story in 2012 was not the above conduct, but rather the DOJ’s
statement declining to criminally prosecute Morgan Stanley for Peter-
son’s conduct.  Specifically, the DOJ stated:
After considering all the available facts and circum-
stances, including that Morgan Stanley constructed and
244 See Press Release, Sec. Exchange Comm’n, SEC Charges Former Morgan
Stanley Executive with FCPA Violations and Investment Adviser Fraud (Apr. 25,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-78.htm [hereinafter
SEC Press Release].
245 Id.
246 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Direc-
tor Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr.
25, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
247 SEC Press Release, supra note 244.
248 Id.
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maintained a system of internal controls, which provided
reasonable assurances that its employees were not brib-
ing government officials, the Department of Justice de-
clined to bring any enforcement action against Morgan
Stanley related to Peterson’s conduct. The company vol-
untarily disclosed this matter and has cooperated
throughout the department’s investigation.249
The DOJ’s declination statement created much buzz and FCPA
Inc. participants en masse published client alerts carrying forward the
DOJ’s statement, touting Morgan Stanley’s so-called declination, and
using the opportunity to market FCPA compliance services.250  The
DOJ’s self-described Morgan Stanley declination in April 2012 oc-
curred in the midst of a vibrant FCPA reform debate, including discus-
sion of amending the FCPA to include a compliance defense, and while
FCPA Inc. was awaiting FCPA guidance.  Keen observers noted the
timing, with one law firm client alert stating:
[D]eclination was [possibly] motivated by the enforce-
ment agencies’ desire to respond to entreaties from com-
panies and business groups to demonstrate the value of
compliance efforts. The Peterson case comes as the DOJ
and SEC are drafting long-awaited public guidance on
the statute, in the wake of concerns that the implement-
ing regulations for the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provi-
sions gave short shift to corporate compliance efforts.251
At a Chief Legal Officer Leadership forum, a general counsel candidly
stated:
If you’re of a cynical frame of mind like I am, though [of
Morgan Stanley’s so-called declination], I will tell you
that I suspect that this announcement by the Justice De-
partment had as much to do with the effort that the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce has been mounting over the last
18 months to try to get Congress to amend the Foreign
249 DOJ Press Release, supra note 246.
250 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Gets Cooperation Credit in FCPA Settlement: The De
Facto “Adequate Procedures” Defense, ARENT FOX (May 4, 2012), http://www.
arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/morgan-stanley-gets-cooperation-credit-fcpa-settle
ments-de-facto-%E2%80%9Cadequate (stating that Morgan Stanley’s so-called
declination “shows the government is ready to give a corporation credit for ‘ade-
quate procedures’ in evaluating any potential FCPA violation”).
251 Lucinda A. Low et al., Avoiding FCPA Prosecution For Employee Conduct,
STEPTOE CLIENT ALERT (May 25, 2012), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-8218.
html.
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Corrupt Practices Act as it does with Morgan Stanley’s
good conduct.252
Indeed, Morgan Stanley’s counsel publicly stated that part of its advo-
cacy in its discussions with the enforcement agencies was to convince
them to publicly send a message on compliance, and that the Morgan
Stanley/Peterson situation provided an “ideal case to do so.”253  The
DOJ embarked on a marketing blitz after its self-described Morgan
Stanley declination.  In September 2012, Assistant Attorney General
Breuer stated,
Because Morgan Stanley voluntarily disclosed Peterson’s
misconduct, fully cooperated with our investigation, and
showed us that it maintained a rigorous compliance pro-
gram, including extensive training of bank employees on
the FCPA and other anti-corruption measures, we de-
clined to bring any enforcement action against the insti-
tution in connection with Peterson’s conduct. That is
smart, and responsible, enforcement.254
The same talking points were also the basis for an October 2012
speech by Breuer in which he stated:
Because Morgan Stanley voluntarily disclosed Peterson’s
misconduct, fully cooperated with our investigation and
showed us that it maintained a rigorous compliance pro-
gram, including extensive training of bank employees on
the FCPA and other anti-corruption measures, we de-
clined to bring any enforcement action against the insti-
tution in connection with Peterson’s conduct. Prosecutors
need to be smart about how they use their discretion in
the FCPA context, as in every context. And, as we did in
the Peterson case, we always attempt to strike an appro-
priate balance between vigorous and responsible
enforcement.255
Morgan Stanley’s FCPA compliance program may have been
robust, however, the DOJ’s use of Morgan Stanley so-called declina-
tion to champion its policy position that a compliance defense is not
252 Larry Boyd, Session Transcript: Larry Boyd EVP, Secretary & General Counsel
Ingram Micro, Inc., ARGYLE J. (May 3, 2012), http://www.argylejournal.com/func
tions/general-counsel/session-transcript-larry-boyd-evp-secretary-general-counsel-
ingram-micro-inc/.
253 See Morgan Stanley’s FCPA Declination and the Benefit of Effective Compli-
ance 2012, DAVIS POLK (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.davispolk.com/Morgan-Stanleys-
FCPA-Declination-and-the-Benefit-of-Effective-Compliance-10-09-2012/.
254 Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 152.
255 Id.
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needed was completely off-base.256  The more likely reason Morgan
Stanley was not prosecuted for Peterson’s actions is because there was
no basis to hold Morgan Stanley liable even under lenient respondeat
superior standards.  This is clear from an analysis of the original
source documents and indeed the enforcement agencies own
statements.
The original source documents evidence the following as to Pe-
terson’s involvement in a real estate investment scheme with Chinese
Official 1.  According to the DOJ’s criminal information:
• “Peterson and Chinese Official 1 had a close personal
relationship before Peterson joined Morgan
Stanley.”257
• A shell company used to facilitate the scheme was
owned 47% by Chinese Official 1 and 53% by Peter-
son and a Canadian Attorney.258
• “Without the knowledge or consent of his superiors at
Morgan Stanley, Peterson sought to compensate Chi-
nese Official 1”;259 and
• “Peterson concealed Chinese Official 1’s personal in-
vestment [in certain properties] from Morgan
Stanley”260
• “Peterson used Morgan Stanley’s past, extensive due
diligence [as to certain of the investment properties]
to benefit his own interests and to act contrary to
Morgan Stanley’s interests.”261
Additional original source documents filed in the Peterson case also
shed further light on information relevant to Morgan Stanley’s so-
called declination. In its sentencing submission, the DOJ stated that
Peterson “repeatedly and explicitly lied to his Morgan Stanley supervi-
sors and co-workers” concerning the conduct at issue and that “each of
Peterson’s [Morgan Stanley required FCPA certifications] was but an-
other lie that lulled his employer into trusting Peterson.”262  In his
256 See, e.g., Complaint at 12, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Peterson, No. 12-224
(E.D.N.Y. 2012), available at  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-
pr2012-78.pdf.
257 See generally Charges at 12, U.S. v. Peterson, Cr. No. 12-224 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/petersong/petersong-
information.pdf.
258 Id. at 5.
259 Id. at 13.
260 Id. at 14.
261 Id. at 15.
262 Plaintiff’s Sentencing Memo at 5, 8, U.S. v. Peterson, No. 12-224 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/103148647/DOJ-Sentencing-Memo-
Garth-Peterson.
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sentencing submission, Peterson stated that he and the Chinese Offi-
cial had a close relationship prior to joining Morgan Stanley and that
the Chinese Official was a close friend—in many ways a father figure
to him—who he helped in order to repay the Chinese Official for giving
him help throughout his career.263 Peterson also asserted that his at-
tempt to influence the “father figure” Chinese Official in the invest-
ment project giving rise to the enforcement action was an attempt to
recoup an investment for his mother.264  Even Morgan Stanley’s coun-
sel specifically said that Peterson was acting “for his own benefit” and
that Morgan Stanley had the advantage of facts because Peterson had
“personal interests in the transactions” at issue and that he acted for
“his own benefit” not Morgan Stanley’s.265
Consistent with these allegations and assertions, Assistant At-
torney General Breuer himself stated that Peterson “actively sought to
evade Morgan Stanley’s internal controls in an effort to enrich himself
and a Chinese government official.”266  Kara Brockmeyer, Chief of the
SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, likewise characterized Peter-
son as a “a rogue employee who took advantage of his firm and its
investment advisory clients, Peterson orchestrated a scheme to ille-
gally win business while lining his own pockets and those of an influ-
ential Chinese official.”267  Even the presiding judge in Peterson’s case
also noted that “it is likely that [Morgan Stanley] would be considered
a victim” of Peterson’s conduct.268
Notwithstanding this information, the DOJ continues to sell its
Morgan Stanley “declination” and predictably profiled it in the Novem-
ber 2012 Guidance.269  The DOJ’s decision to not criminally charge
Morgan Stanley based on Peterson’s conduct was not a declination,
rather it was what the law commanded.  It is a sorry state of affairs
indeed to praise the DOJ for acting in a way the law commands.  Cer-
tain observers and commentators recognized Morgan Stanley’s so-
called declination for what it was.270  However, most did not and sim-
263 See Defendant’s Sentencing Memo at 10, U.S. v. Peterson, No. 12-224
(E.D.N.Y. 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/103148964/Garth-Peter
son-Sentencing-Memo.
264 Id. at 24.
265 See Morgan Stanley’s FCPA Declination and the Benefit of Effective Compli-
ance 2012, supra note 253.
266 DOJ Press Release, supra note 246.
267 See SEC Press Release, supra note 244.
268 U.S. v. Peterson, 859 F.Supp. 2d 477, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
269 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 61.
270 See Lucinda A. Low et al., Avoiding FCPA Prosecution For Employee Conduct,
STEPTOE CLIENT ALERT (May 25, 2012), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-8218.
html (“[T]he element of personal benefit derived by Peterson from his conduct is
likely significant. [. . .] Such benefits call into question whether Peterson was re-
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ply drank the DOJ’s “Kool-Aid” evidencing a herd mentality that has
impacted the nature and quality of certain FCPA reporting.
3. Wal-Mart Potential FCPA Exposure
Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure was yet another event
made into a prominent story in 2012.  High-profile instances of FCPA
scrutiny focus attention on the law and its enforcement across a broad
spectrum.  In the spring of 2012, arguably the most high-profile in-
stance of scrutiny in the FCPA’s thirty-five year history occurred as
Wal-Mart’s alleged conduct in Mexico dominated the news cycle.  Wal-
Mart’s scrutiny has been instructive in many ways at a key point in
time for the FCPA, and this section uses Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA
exposure as a prism to further critically examine the current FCPA
enforcement environment.  This section addresses (i) whether Con-
gress intended in passing the FCPA to capture the type of payments at
issue in Wal-Mart; (ii) what FCPA case law instructs as to the pay-
ments; (iii) whether what Congress intended or what courts have con-
cluded even matters; and (iv) the impact of Wal-Mart’s scrutiny on the
company, as well as industry peers.
a. The New York Times Articles
Even though Wal-Mart disclosed FCPA scrutiny in a December
2011 SEC filing,271 to the casual observer and many major media out-
lets, it seemed that Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny began on April 21,
2012, when the New York Times ran a front-page article titled “Vast
Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Strug-
gle.”272  The Times article was both unremarkable and remarkable.
The unremarkable portion of the Times article was that a for-
eign subsidiary of a multi-national company operating in a FCPA
high-risk jurisdiction allegedly made payments to “foreign officials” to
facilitate the issuance of certain licenses or permits.  The Times article
ally acting for the benefit of his employer, a key requirement for corporate vicari-
ous liability. Moreover, it seems clear that the government believes Morgan
Stanley was ultimately duped by its employee and entered into transactions in
good faith, without knowledge of the personal benefits being derived, despite their
controls.”). See also Michael Volkov, Corruption, Crime & Compliance, VOLKOV
(Jan. 6, 2013), http://corruptioncrimecompliance.com/2013/01/five-biggest-fcpa-sto
ries-of-2012/ (“contrary to many commentators, I have never thought the Morgan
Stanley case was as significant as others have written. It is a case which is limited
by its facts to the actions of a ‘rogue’ employee.”).
271 See Wal-Mart, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 6, 2011).
272 See generally David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-
Mart After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?
pagewanted=all.
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focused on Wal-Mart’s largest foreign subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico,
and suggested that Wal-Mart Mexico “orchestrated a campaign of brib-
ery to win market dominance” and “paid bribes to obtain permits in
virtually every corner” of Mexico.273  A former Wal-Mart Mexico real
estate department executive described how the payments “targeted
mayors and city council members, obscure urban planners, low-level
bureaucrats who issues permits – anyone with the power to thwart
Wal-Mart’s growth.”274  According to the article, the former executive
said the payments “bought zoning approvals, reductions in environ-
mental impact fees and the allegiance of neighborhood leaders.”275  Ac-
cording to the Times, the idea behind the payments “was to build
hundreds of new stores so fast that competitors would not have time to
react” and the payments “accelerated growth . . . got zoning maps
changed . . . made environmental objections vanish” and that “permits
that typically took months to process magically materialized in
days.”276  Many of the payments were funneled through “trusted fix-
ers, known as ‘gestores.’”277  According to the Times, Wal-Mart Mexico
“had taken steps to conceal [the payments] from Wal-Mart’s headquar-
ters in Bentonville, Ark.,” and Wal-Mart Mexico’s chief auditor altered
reports sent to Bentonville discussing various problematic
payments.278
By terming a portion of the Times article unremarkable, this
does not mean to suggest that such payments will not attract scrutiny
by the DOJ or SEC.  The payments have already attracted scrutiny
from the enforcement agencies and Wal-Mart will likely be under
FCPA scrutiny for years to come.  Rather, the unremarkable portion of
the Times article, in addition to what is stated above, is that Wal-Mart
is now one of approximately one-hundred companies the subject of
FCPA scrutiny.  Indeed a subsequent Times article in November 2012
regarding Wal-Mart’s potential exposure, albeit one which received





277 See id. See also Associated Press, Wal-Mart Bribery Allegations Put Focus on
Mexican Middlemen Used to Grease Bureaucratic Wheels, CBS NEWS (Apr. 24,
2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57419686/wal-mart-bribery-allega
tions-put-focus-on-mexican-middlemen-used-to-grease-bureaucratic-wheels/ (ex-
plaining that stores often “funnel a portion of the fees they charge clients to cor-
rupt officials to smooth the issuance of permits, approvals and other government
stamps” and in Mexico “where laws on zoning rules, construction codes and build-
ing permits are vague or laxly enforced, the difference between opening a store
quickly and having it held up for months may depend on using a gestor.”).
278 Barstow, supra note 272.
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that Wal-Mart’s investigation “was uncovering the kinds of problems
and oversights that plague many global corporations.”279
The remarkable aspects of the Times article include the con-
duct or lack thereof of Wal-Mart and its top executives upon learning
of its Mexican subsidiary’s conduct.  Even in 2005, most business lead-
ers, audit committees, and boards tended to overreact to potential
FCPA issues and often reflexively launched broad internal investiga-
tions. The payment issues at Wal-Mart Mexico, however, apparently
resulted in the opposite at Wal-Mart’s corporate headquarters.  The
Times article stated that in 2005:
Wal-Mart dispatched investigators to Mexico City, and
within days they unearthed evidence of widespread brib-
ery.  They found a paper trail of hundreds of suspected
payments totaling more than $24 million.  They also
found documents showing that Wal-Mart de Mexico’s top
executives not only knew about the payments, but had
taken steps to conceal them from Wal-Mart’s headquar-
ters in Bentonville, Arkansas.280
According to the Times, Wal-Mart’s lead investigator, a former
FBI agent, “recommended that Wal-Mart expand the investigation,”
but “Wal-Mart’s leaders shut it down.”281  The article states, “in one
meeting where the bribery case was discussed, H. Lee Scott, Jr., then
Wal-Mart’s chief executive, rebuked internal investigators for being
overly aggressive.”282  The Times article also contains several internal
documents including law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher’s 2005 “inves-
tigative work plan,” which called for tracing all payments to anyone
who helped Wal-Mart Mexico obtain permits for the previous five
years.283  The Times stated that:
Willkie Farr recommended the kind of independent,
spare-no-expenses investigation major corporations
routinely undertake when confronted with allegations
of serious wrongdoing by top executives.  Wal-Mart’s
leaders rejected this approach.  Instead, records show,
they decided Wal-Mart’s lawyers would supervise a
far more limited ‘preliminary inquiry’ by in-house
investigators.284
279 Stephanie Clifford & David Barstow, Wal-Mart Inquiry Reflects Alarm on Cor-
ruption, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business
/wal-mart-expands-foreign-bribery-investigation.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.




284 See Barstow, supra note 272.
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In 2006, Wal-Mart again considered a full investigation of the conduct
in Mexico but that, in the end, the company largely delegated responsi-
bility for the investigation to its subsidiary Wal-Mart Mexico.285  An-
other remarkable aspect of the Times investigation revealed how
Eduardo Castro-Wright, who was the CEO of Wal-Mart Mexico during
a critical time period at issue, was known to be involved in the Mexi-
can payments, but nevertheless thereafter was promoted by Wal-
Mart.286
Notwithstanding whatever may have occurred within Wal-
Mart in 2005 and 2006 upon learning of potentially problematic pay-
ments, the subsequent November 2012 Times article suggests that
Wal-Mart was pro-actively seeking to understand its FCPA risks long
before the  front-page Times article in April 2012.287  According to the
Times, Wal-Mart’s internal review began in Spring 2011 when Jeffrey
Gearhart, Wal-Mart’s general counsel, learned of an FCPA enforce-
ment action against Tyson Foods (like Wal-Mart, a company head-
quartered in Arkansas).288  According to the Times, “the audit began
in Mexico, China and Brazil, the countries Wal-Mart executives con-
sidered the most likely source of problems” and Wal-Mart hired profes-
sional accounting and legal firms to conduct the audit.289
The Times explosive April 2012 front-page article was followed
by another front-page article in December 2012 titled, “The Bribery
Aisle: How Wal-Mart Used Payoffs to Get Its Way in Mexico.”290  Based
on travel to dozens of towns and cities in Mexico, gathering tens of
thousands of documents related to Wal-Mart de Mexico permits, and
interviewing scores of government officials and Wal-Mart employees,
the article, in pertinent part, stated:
The Times’s examination reveals that Wal-Mart de Mex-
ico was not the reluctant victim of a corrupt culture that
insisted on bribes as the cost of doing business. Nor did it
pay bribes merely to speed up routine approvals. Rather,
Wal-Mart de Mexico was an aggressive and creative cor-
rupter, offering large payoffs to get what the law other-
wise prohibited. It used bribes to subvert democratic
governance – public votes, open debates, transparent
procedures. It used bribes to circumvent regulatory safe-
285 See id.
286 Id.
287 See generally Clifford & Barstow, supra note 281.
288 See id.; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Tyson Foods Inc. Agrees to Pay $4 Mil-
lion Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Allegations (Feb. 10, 2011),
available at  http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-crm-171.html.
289 See Clifford & Barstow, supra note 281.
290 Barstow, supra note 272.
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guards that protect Mexican citizens from unsafe con-
struction. It used bribes to outflank rivals. Through
confidential Wal-Mart documents, The Times identified
19 stores sites across Mexico that were the target of Wal-
Mart de Mexico’s bribes. The Times then matched infor-
mation about specific bribes against permit records for
each site. Clear patterns emerged. Over and over, for ex-
ample, the dates of bribe payments coincided with dates
when critical permits were issued. Again and again, the
strictly forbidden became miraculously attainable.
Thanks to eight bribe payments totaling $341,000, for
example, Wal-Mart built a Sam’s Club in one of Mexico
City’s most densely populated neighborhoods, near the
Basilica de Guadalupe, without a construction license, or
an environmental permit, or an urban impact assess-
ment, or even a traffic permit. Thanks to nine bribe pay-
ments totaling $765,000, Wal-Mart built a vast
refrigerated distribution center in an environmentally
fragile flood basin north of Mexico City, in an area where
electricity was so scarce that many smaller developers
were turned away.291
The majority of the article focuses on alleged bribe payments –
approximately $200,000 in all – to build a Wal-Mart de Mexico store in
Teotihuacan, a city home to several historical treasures.292  The arti-
cle’s allegations focus on a changed zoning map, various permits and
licenses needed for construction, town council approval, potential do-
nations to Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology and History
(INAH – the official guardian of Mexico’s cultural treasures), and of-
fers of money to neighborhoods to expand it cemetery, pave a road,
build a handball court, pay for paint and computers for a school, and
build a new office building.293
Like the April 2012 Times article, the article also focused on
the conduct of business leaders at corporate headquarters.  The Times
article stated that, “[d]espite multiple news accounts of possible
bribes, Wal-Mart’s leaders in the United States took no steps to inves-
tigate Wal-Mart de Mexico.”294  The article also quotes a Wal-Mart
spokesman as saying that while executives in the United States were
aware of the controversies surrounding the Teotihucan store, “none of
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for real estate projects in Mexico during [the relevant time period] re-
call any mention of bribery allegations related to the store.”295
While the December 2012 Times article provided more factual
detail than the original April 2011 article, from an FCPA perspective,
the issues largely remain the same. In short, Wal-Mart dominated the
news cycle at various points in 2012, not because it joined a list of
approximately one-hundred companies the subject of FCPA scrutiny—
a fact known by informed observes since December 2011—but rather,
because of the conduct or lack thereof of Wal-Mart and its top execu-
tives upon learning of potential FCPA issues.  Against this backdrop,
it is useful to view the Wal-Mart story as a corporate governance sand-
wich with the FCPA merely as a condiment.
In response to the April 2012 Times article, Wal-Mart noted,
among other things, that many of the alleged violations were over six
years old and that “in a large global enterprise such as Wal-Mart,
sometimes issues arise despite our best efforts and intentions.”296  A
Wal-Mart statement further stated that, “When [problematic issues
arise], we take them seriously and act quickly to understand what
happened.  We take action and work to implement changes so that the
issue doesn’t happen again.  That’s what we’re doing today.”297  In re-
sponse to the December 2012 Times article, Wal-Mart stated:
Over the past 20 months, we have made significant im-
provements to our compliance programs around the
world and have taken a number of specific, concrete ac-
tions with respect to our processes, procedures and peo-
ple. Over the past several months we have:
• Established several new compliance positions
around the world;
• Directed more than 300 third-party legal and
accounting experts who have dedicated in ex-
cess of 79,000 hours to this effort;
• Conducted more than 85 in-country visits and
more than 1,000 interviews of market
personnel;
• Spent more than $35 million on new processes
and procedures; and
295 Id.
296 Sam Mamudi, Wal-Mart: Checking into Mexican corruption claims,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/wal-mart-
checking-into-mexican-corruption-claims-2012-04-21?siteid=rss&rss=1.
297 Id.
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• Conducted training sessions attended by more
than 19,000 associates.298
b. Issues Raised by Wal-Mart’s Scrutiny
In the midst of media feeding frenzies and a divisive company
serving as a political punching bag, it may appear old-fashioned to
pause and analyze what type of payments Congress intended to cap-
ture in passing the FCPA and how courts have interpreted the FCPA
in the rare instances FCPA enforcement theories have been subjected
to judicial scrutiny. Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny, like most other in-
stances of FCPA scrutiny, raises two distinct and important questions
that can be asked about most instances of FCPA scrutiny in this new
era of FCPA enforcement.
The first and easiest question is, given the DOJ and SEC’s cur-
rent enforcement theories, can the Mexican payments in connection
with permitting, licensing and inspection issues expose Wal-Mart to
an FCPA enforcement action? The answer is likely yes, and in the past
few years the enforcement agencies have brought several corporate
FCPA enforcement actions premised on payments to obtain foreign li-
censes, permits and the like.299
The second, more important question is whether Congress, in
passing the FCPA, intended to capture payments occurring outside the
context of foreign government procurement and involving ministerial
and clerical acts by foreign officials.  The answer from the FCPA’s leg-
islative history is no.
In the mid-1970’s Congress learned of a variety of foreign cor-
porate payments to a variety of recipients for a variety of reasons.
Congress accepted and acknowledged that it was capturing only a nar-
row range of foreign payments when it passed the FCPA.300  For in-
stance, the relevant Senate Report stated:
The statute covers payments made to foreign officials for
the purpose of obtaining business or influencing legisla-
298 David Tovar, Walmart Vice Pres. Corp. Comm., Walmart Statement in Re-
sponse to December 17 New York Times Article About Allegations of Corruption in
Mexico (Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2012/1
2/17/walmart-statement-in-response-to-new-york-times-article-about-allegations-
of-corruption-in-mexico.
299 See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 3.
300 See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST.
L. J. 929, 931 (2012). See also Declaration of Professor Michael Koehler in Support
of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count One Through Ten of the Indictment, U.S.
v. Carson, Case No. SA CR 09-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49310598/U-S-v-Stuart-Carson-el-al-Declaration-of-Pro
fessor-Michael-Koehler.
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tion or regulations.  The statute does not, therefore,
cover so-called ‘grease payments’ such as payments for
expediting shipments through customs or placing a
transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits,
or obtaining adequate police protection, transactions
which may involve even the proper performance of du-
ties. [. . .] The committee has recognized that the bill
would not reach all corrupt payments overseas.301
Likewise, the relevant House Report stated:
The bill’s coverage does not extend to so-called grease or
facilitating payments.  [. . .]  The language of the bill is
deliberately cast in terms which differentiate between
such payments and facilitating payments, sometimes
called ‘grease payments’. For example, a gratuity paid to
a customs official to speed the processing of a customs
document would not be reached by the bill. Nor would it
reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the
expeditious performance of similar duties of an essen-
tially ministerial or clerical nature which must of neces-
sity by performed in any event.  While payments made to
assure or to speed the proper performance of a foreign
official’s duties may be reprehensible in the United
States, the committee recognizes that they are not neces-
sarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not
feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to
eradicate all such payments. As a result, the committee
has not attempted to reach such payments. [. . .] The
committee fully recognizes that the proposed law will not
reach all corrupt payments overseas.302
Of particular note to the Wal-Mart payments, Representative Robert
Eckhardt (D-TX, a Congressional leader on the foreign payments is-
sue) stated on the House floor merely a month prior to the FCPA’s
passage that,
Payments to a [foreign official with ministerial or clerical
duties] for instance, to complete a form that ought, in eq-
uity, to be completed, to give everybody equal treatment,
to move the goods off a dock which he will not move with-
out a tip, a mordida, I think, as they call it in the Span-
ish language, a facilitating payment, or a grease
payment, would not constitute a foreign bribe.303
301 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 7 (1977).
302 H.R. REP. NO.  95-640, at 4-8 (1977).
303 See 123 CONG. REC. 36306 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977) (statement of Rep.
Eckhardt).
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Consistent with this Congressional intent, the FCPA specifically ex-
cluded from the definition of “foreign official” “any employee of a for-
eign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical” when it
passed in December of 1977.304  This was the FCPA’s original, albeit
indirect, facilitation payment or grease exception.  When Congress
amended the FCPA in 1988, it, among other things, changed the defi-
nition of foreign official by removing this indirect facilitation payment
exception from the “foreign official” definition and creating the stand-
alone facilitation payment exception currently found in the statute.305
The relevant House Report indicated that Congress did not seek to dis-
turb Congress’s original intent, stating:
The policy adopted by Congress in 1977 remains valid, in
terms of both U.S. law enforcement and foreign relations
considerations.  Any prohibition under U.S. law against
this type of petty corruption would be exceedingly diffi-
cult to enforce, not only by U.S. prosecutors but by com-
pany officials themselves.  Thus, while such payments
should not be condoned, they may appropriately be ex-
cluded from the reach of the FCPA.  U.S. enforcement re-
sources should be devoted to activities that have a much
greater impact on foreign policy.306
Even if a payment does not meet the FCPA’s facilitation pay-
ments exception, the “obtain or retain business” element, among
others, must also be met in order for there to be a violation of the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  The enforcement theory likely to be at
issue in Wal-Mart has been subjected to judicial scrutiny at least four
times.  As highlighted above in connection with Guidance discussion of
the “obtain or retain business” element:  (i) in 1990, a trial court
granted Alfredo Duran’s motion for acquittal after the DOJ’s evidence
in an FCPA action alleging payments to officials of the Dominican Re-
public in order to obtain the release of two aircraft seized by the gov-
ernment;307 (ii) in 2002, a trial court granted David Kay and Douglas
Murphy’s motion to dismiss a DOJ indictment in an FCPA action
304 See The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1494, § 103(b).
305 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).
306 132 CONG. REC. H2946 (daily ed. May. 20, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell &
Wirth).
307 See Judgment of Acquittal, United States v. Duran, Case No. 89-802-CR-KE-
HOE (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 1990), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/92621550/
USA-v-Pou-Et-Al-Judgment-of-Aquittal-Alfredo-Duran. See also Indictment,
United States v. Duran, Case No. 89-802-CR-KEHOE (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 1989),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pouj/1989-11-21-
pouj-indict-%28pouj-durana-guaschj%29.pdf.
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based on allegations that the defendants made improper payments to
Haitian foreign officials for the purpose of reducing customs duties and
sales taxes owed to the government;308 (iii) in 2002, a trial court
granted a motion to dismiss brought by Eric Mattson and James Har-
ris in an SEC case based on alleged goodwill payments to an Indone-
sian tax official for a reduction in a tax assessment;309 and (iv) on
appeal in the Kay case, the Fifth Circuit held that making payments to
a foreign official to lower taxes and custom duties in a foreign country
can provide an unfair advantage to the payer over competitors and
thereby assist the payer in obtaining and retaining business.  Never-
theless, the Fifth Circuit empathically stated that not all such pay-
ments to a foreign official outside the context of directly securing a
foreign government contract violate the FCPA, it merely held that
such payments “could” violate the FCPA.310
In short, the enforcement theory that payments to a foreign of-
ficial outside the context of foreign government procurement fall under
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions has been subjected to judicial scru-
tiny four times, and the enforcement agencies lost three of those cases,
with the fourth case, the 5th Circuit’s decision in Kay, being equivocal.
Wal-Mart’s alleged payments logically implicate a key portion from
the Kay ruling:
There are bound to be circumstances in which such a cost
reduction does nothing other than increase the profit-
ability of an already-profitable venture or ensure profit-
ability of some start-up venture. Indeed, if the
government is correct that anytime operating costs are
reduced the beneficiary of such advantage is assisted in
getting or keeping business, the FCPA’s language that
expresses the necessary element of assisting is obtaining
or retaining business would be unnecessary, and thus
surplusage—a conclusion that we are forbidden to
reach.311
c. Do the Issues Even Matter?
In this era of FCPA enforcement, when nearly all corporate set-
tlements are negotiated behind closed doors in Washington D.C., and
when NPAs and DPAs are used to resolve nearly every instance of cor-
porate FCPA scrutiny in the absence of meaningful judicial scrutiny, it
308 See United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 681-82 (S.D.Tex. 2002).
309 See Memorandum and Order, Sec. and Exchange Comm’n v. Mattson, Civil
Action No. H-01-3106 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2002), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/83019022/SEC-v-Eric-Mattson-and-James-Harris.
310 United States v. Kay, 359 F. 3d 738, 740 (2004).
311 Kay, 359 F.3d. at 760.
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seems a bit old-fashioned to consider Congressional intent and rele-
vant case law implicated by the Wal-Mart payments. However, the
rule of law demands such an analysis.
A logical and practical question thus becomes: does Congres-
sional intent and relevant case law even matter in this new era of
FCPA enforcement when enforcement agencies are not held to their
burden of proof in corporate enforcement actions and there is no mean-
ingful judicial scrutiny of such actions?  As silly and shocking as it may
sound, the answer is no, it will not matter if Wal-Mart’s payments are
the type Congress intended to capture in passing the FCPA, nor will it
matter what relevant case law instructs as to the payments.
Sure, Wal-Mart’s counsel can make legal and factual argu-
ments behind closed doors in Washington D.C.  However, to truly chal-
lenge the DOJ in an instance of FCPA scrutiny and hold the DOJ to its
high burden of proof at trial, the company must first be criminally in-
dicted, which few corporate leaders are willing to let happen. It is sim-
ply easier, more certain, and more cost-efficient to resolve FCPA
scrutiny, notwithstanding the enforcement theories or the existence of
valid and legitimate defenses.  This dynamic is facilitated by the exis-
tence of the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving FCPA enforce-
ment actions.  Namely, cooperation and acceptance of responsibility
are rewarded, but mounting a legal defense based on the law and facts
is not cooperation or acceptance of responsibility, and is thus pun-
ished.  Indeed, in the FCPA’s thirty-five year history, it is believed that
only two corporate defendants have held the DOJ to its high burden of
proof at trial.  Even though the DOJ’s ultimate record in those two
instances is 0-2,312 Wal-Mart will not become the third company in
FCPA history to hold the DOJ to it burden of proof.
In the aftermath of the Times articles, there was extensive
commentary and criticism that Wal-Mart’s conduct would result in
FCPA liability.  One of the most notable instances involved comments
made by business mogul Donald Trump, on CNBC’s Squawk Box pro-
gram, during which he called the FCPA a “horrible law.”313  However,
312 See  One Win, One Loss, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 16, 2011), http://www.fcpapro
fessor.com/one-win-one-loss; Milestone Erased: Judge Matz Dismisses Lindsey
Convictions, Says that “Dr. Lindsey and Mr. Lee Were Through a Sever Ordeal”
and that Lindsey Manufacturing, a “Small, Once Highly Respected Enter-




313 See Martin Gould, Trump Slams FCPA Law, Killing American Business, NEW-
SMAX (May 15, 2012), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Trump-bribery-for
eign-business/2012/05/15/id/439104 (linking to video of Donald Trump on CNBC’s
Squawk Box).
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Trump, like many others commenting on the Times articles, conflated
the issues and failed to understand the two distinct and important
questions that can be asked about many instances of FCPA scrutiny,
including Wal-Mart’s.  First, Wal-Mart’s alleged conduct in Mexico,
and perhaps similar conduct in other countries, can expose the com-
pany to an enforcement action given the DOJ’s and SEC’s current en-
forcement theories. Second, and more importantly, Congress did not
intend in passing the FCPA to capture payments to foreign officials oc-
curring outside the context of foreign government procurement and in-
volving ministerial and clerical acts, and the enforcement agencies
have an overall losing record on this enforcement theory when sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny.
The answers to these questions do not make the FCPA a “horri-
ble law,” but rather suggest that FCPA enforcement has, in many
cases, gone off the rail, and many solutions lie not in the statute itself,
but in addressing the policies which facilitate such enforcement in this
new era.
d. The Impact of Wal-Mart’s Scrutiny
Notwithstanding the old fashioned issues rooted in the rule of
law discussed above, the fact remains that Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny
has already, and will continue to impact the company, as well as in-
dustry peers.
Investor Reaction
Perhaps the most immediate and tangible impact of Wal-
Mart’s FCPA scrutiny was investor reaction and the decline in its
stock price following the April 2012 Times article.  On the last trading
day before the Times article, Wal-Mart’s stock closed at $62.45.314  The
first trading day after the Times article, the stock dropped 4.7% and
continued on a downward trend for a few days eclipsing billions of dol-
lars in shareholder value.315  Investors were spooked by the intense
media coverage and were likely paranoid by some of the wildly specu-
lative comments, including that Wal-Mart could face approximately
$13 billion in ultimate fine and penalty amounts.316
314 See Wal-Mart Probe of Possible Briber in Mexico May Prompt Executive Depar-
tures, TELEGRAM (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.telegram.com/article/20120423/
NEWS/120429851/1237.
315 See Judy Greenwald, Wal-Mart FCPA Compliance Investigations Could Result
in Fines, Penalties Litigation, BUS. INS. (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.businessinsur
ance.com/article/20121125/NEWS07/311259975#full_story.
316 See Eric Platt, How A Walmart Bribery Fine Could Spiral Up Over $13 Billion,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2012), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-04-23/
markets/31385329_1_new-location-international-results-stores.  The largest com-
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However, it did not take long for Wal-Mart’s stock to recover its
value.  As of this writing, Wal-Mart’s stock price is $79.86 per share317
demonstrating that, absent certain limited exceptions, when a com-
pany discloses or is otherwise reported to be under FCPA scrutiny,
other than a potential temporary decline in a company’s stock often
based on misinformed doomsday scenarios, the market cares little
about FCPA scrutiny and realizes how diluted FCPA enforcement has
become in this current era.  Indeed, commenting on the rapid rise in
Wal-Mart’s stock price after the Times induced dip, a Forbes commen-
tator stated, “My 30 years of experience in the markets has repeatedly
shown to me that whenever a company is accused of violations of
FCPA, headlines are always scary, but in the end, the downdraft in the
stock invariably becomes a buying opportunity.”318
Lengthy and Costly World-Wide Review
Although investors ultimately yawned at Wal-Mart’s FCPA
scrutiny, the fact remains such scrutiny will result in a gray cloud
hanging over the company for several years.  Typically, FCPA scrutiny
lasts between two to four years from the point of first disclosure to any
enforcement action.  In some cases, such as Pfizer’s 2012 FCPA settle-
ment, this time period can be between six and eight years.319  Wal-
Mart is likely to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in professional
fees and expenses during this pre-enforcement action phase.320
Even though FCPA conduct is often highly localized and re-
sults from the actions of specific employees facing geographically spe-
cific business conditions, the DOJ and SEC will surely be interested in
bined U.S.  fine and penalty amount in FCPA history is $800 million. Press Re-
lease, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Com-
bined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
317 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data, NASDAQ, http://www.nas
daq.com/symbol/wmt (last visited May 16, 2013).
318 Nigam Arora, Mexican Bribery Gave Me A Chance To Make Money In Wal-
Mart, FORBES (May 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/
05/17/mexican-bribery-gave-me-a-chance-to-make-money-in-wal-mart/4/.
319 See e.g., Of Note From the Pfizer Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug.
9, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/of-note-from-the-pfizer-enforcement-action
(noting the eight year time period from Pfizer’s disclosure until resolution of the
enforcement action).
320 For instance, Avon has reportedly spent approximately $280 million in pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses since becoming the subject of
FCPA scrutiny in 2008. See Samuel Rubenfeld, Avon Begins FCPA Settlement
Talks, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/
08/01/avon-begins-fcpa-settlement-talks/.
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Wal-Mart’s conduct in other jurisdictions besides Mexico.  Among
other potential areas of inquiry, the enforcement agencies are likely to
take a keen interest in how Wal-Mart obtained foreign licenses or per-
mits in other FCPA high-risk jurisdictions.  Companies subject to
FCPA scrutiny often initiate such lengthy and costly reviews to
demonstrate to the enforcement agencies cooperation and a commit-
ment to compliance, mindful that the agencies themselves will soon
ask the “where else” question.  Indeed, it was soon learned that Wal-
Mart’s review has expanded beyond Mexico to also include Brazil,
China, South Africa, and India.321  Given the expansive enforcement
theories discussed above concerning license, permit and related issues,
it is highly likely that Wal-Mart will learn of additional instances over
the past decade in which someone in its organization made payments
similar to the Mexican payments giving rise to its initial FCPA
scrutiny.
FCPA Related Civil Suits
Even though courts have held that the FCPA does not contain
a private right of action,322 Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny has resulted in
a flood of private shareholder lawsuits that will impact the company.
Consistent with recent trends in this new era of FCPA enforcement,
various plaintiff law firms announced investigations of Wal-Mart, its
board, and its executives within days of the April 2012 Times arti-
cle.323  Approximately ten days later, civil suits that generally tracked
the Times article began to pour in as shareholders brought derivative
claims against various officers and directors, alleging breach of fiduci-
ary duty as well as shareholder class actions suits to recover for loss in
company stock (notwithstanding the stock issues discussed above).324
At present, at least twelve shareholder suits have been filed against
Wal-Mart and/or its officers and directors in the wake of the Times
article.  Even though such suits in the FCPA context rarely survive the
motion to dismiss stage, it is not uncommon for companies to settle
such claims for millions of dollars, a sum that often represents mere
nuisance value for the companies, but a handsome pay day for the
plaintiff’s firm.325
321 See Clifford & Barstow, supra note 279.
322 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
323 See e.g., Kendall Law Group Investigates Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., BUSINESSWIRE
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://eon.businesswire.com/news/eon/20120423005443/en/wal-
mart/walmart/wmt.
324 See e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Pension Plan Sues Wal-Mart Officials Over Fail-
ures, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/business/pen
sion-plan-sues-wal-mart-over-bribery-case.html?_r=2.
325 Nice Pay Day, But What Did You Accomplish? FCPA PROFESSOR (Sep. 20,
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/nice-pay-day-but-what-did-you-accomplish.
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Retail Industry Sweep
As demonstrated in Table I, industry sweeps often serve as the
foundation for FCPA enforcement actions.  Wal-Mart is clearly not the
only company subject to the FCPA that needs licenses and permits
when doing business in Mexico or other countries.  Thus, it is not sur-
prising that its exposure caused much angst among other retailers and
resulted in a sweep of the retail industry.  According to a Reuters re-
port, “other retail companies have also since reported to U.S. agencies
suspicions of their own potential violations, which in turn has the Jus-
tice Department and SEC considering a sweep of the entire
industry.”326
On one level, industry sweeps represent effective law enforce-
ment.  Yet on another level, industry sweeps have the potential to turn
into boundless enforcement agency fishing expeditions, the cost of
which are borne by the companies subject to the sweep.  The effects of
such boundless sweeps raise a host of legal and policy issues when
their origins are based on disputed enforcement theories that the
agencies have an overall losing record when subjected to judicial
scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined and placed in better context promi-
nent FCPA issues from 2012.  By doing so, readers should have a more
informed base to analyze FCPA enforcement trends, to assess enforce-
ment agency rhetoric and policy positions, and to sift through the
mounds of information disseminated by FCPA Inc.
326 See Aruna Viswanatha, Exclusive: U.S. Weighs Retail Sweep After Wal-Mart
Bribery Scandal, REUTERS (July 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/
27/us-usa-retail-bribery-idUSBRE86P1TZ20120727.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 76 19-JUL-13 7:54
